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1  What is corporate governance and why does it matter? 
Since the early 1980s ‘corporate governance’ has become a central issue of policy 
debate in the developed economies. Emanating especially from the United States and 
Britain, this debate has focused on both the restructuring of existing business 
corporations that appear to have lost their value-creating capabilities and the conditions 
for the emergence of new innovative companies, particularly in new growing industries. 
In the 1990s the corporate governance debate spread to many other parts of the world as 
(erstwhile) Socialist and Third World nations sought to create and support the types of 
business enterprises that would enable them to participate more fully in the market-
oriented global economy. The collapse of the former Soviet Union, the emergence of 
China as an economic power, the stagnation of the Japanese economy, the Asian 
financial crisis, and the Internet boom and then bust all, in one way or another, made the 
governance of business corporations a topic of widespread interest and concern. 
In terms of content, most of the debate has been about the mechanisms of corporate 
governance; at issue are the types of information about corporate decisions, activities, 
and performance that the corporation should make public and the types of procedures 
for taking corrective actions when necessary. From this ‘mechanisms’ perspective, the 
debate revolves around questions such as how to make corporate financial reporting 
more ‘transparent’ to public shareholders and other stakeholders; what types of people 
should sit on boards of directors or other oversight bodies to ensure that executives act 
in the interests of stakeholders; how the rights of minority shareholders can be 
preserved in cases where majority shareholders exercise allocative control; and what 
modes of compensation will give executives and directors an interest in engaging in 
‘good corporate governance’. 
It is obviously important to resolve questions concerning the appropriate mechanisms of 
corporate governance if the practice of corporate governance is to achieve desired ends. 
But if the desired end is economic development – that is, a process of growth that can 
permanently raise the standards of living of more and more people over time – then it is 
necessary to understand the corporate governance institutions that, in different times and 
places, have promoted economic development. Ultimately what is required is a theory 
of business enterprise as a fundamental building block of a theory of economic 
development. A focus on the institutions of corporate governance asks why certain rules 
and norms prevail in a corporate governance regime, including by whom and for whom 
corporations should be run, and under what conditions these institutions support 
economic development.  
Most participants in the corporate governance debates, including economists, believe, 
quite mistakenly I shall argue, that they already possess the basic answers to these 
systemic questions, so that one need focus solely on the mechanisms of corporate 
governance. According to the conventional corporate governance paradigm, emanating 
primarily from the United States and, to a lesser extent, Britain, it is overwhelmingly 
assumed that ‘good corporate governance’ means ‘maximizing shareholder value’. It is 
this assumption that, whether those concerned with corporate governance are aware of it 
or not, links the narrow (albeit important) debate on the mechanisms of corporate 
governance with the much broader and more fundamental debate on the institutions of 
corporate governance. The assumption that good corporate governance means   2
maximizing shareholder value leads one not only to use shareholder value as the 
measure of corporate performance but, relatedly, to focus on certain types of disclosure, 
oversight, and corrective procedures to the exclusion of other possibilities for 
influencing corporate behavior and taking corrective action. To understand why the 
debate on corporate governance must deal with institutions rather than simply 
mechanisms, we must ask a) what ‘maximizing shareholder value’ means, and b) why it 
is conventionally assumed that among all the possible corporate stakeholders – owners, 
creditors, employees, contractors, taxpayers, or citizens – it is shareholders in particular 
for whom value should be maximized. 
The theoretical foundation for the position that good corporate governance means 
maximizing shareholder value is the neoclassical theory of the market economy, 
adapted to take into account selected aspects of the reality of an actual corporate 
economy such as the United States. In the next section of the paper, I shall explain why 
this theoretical foundation is highly problematic for understanding the operation and 
performance of the business corporation and hence the institutions that, for the sake of 
economic development, should govern it. The main problem, I shall argue, is that the 
market-economy perspective cannot comprehend the process of innovation, including 
the role of the business corporation in that process. Yet without innovation – defined in 
economic terms as the generation of higher quality, lower cost products than were 
previously available given prevailing factor prices – economic development cannot take 
place. A confrontation with the conventional wisdom concerning corporate governance, 
therefore, entails a confrontation with the standard theoretical perspective of how a 
developed economy functions and performs (see Lazonick 2003b). 
This confrontation calls for a theory of innovative enterprise that can serve as a 
foundation for analyzing what types of corporate governance institutions will promote, 
and what types will undermine, innovation and economic development. In Section 
Three of this paper, I will show that the standard neoclassical theory of the firm – one 
that is consistent with the theory of the market economy – is a theory of the non-
innovating firm, and hence cannot serve as a foundation for an analysis of the types of 
corporate governance institutions that can promote innovation and economic 
development. By transforming the assumptions of the standard neoclassical theory of 
the firm, however, we can construct a theory of the innovating firm that, when 
embedded in comparative-historical analysis, can provide a basis for analyzing the 
relation between corporate governance institutions and economic development. As I 
shall explain in Section Three, this theory of the innovating firm emphasizes the 
importance for innovation of three social conditions: strategic control, organizational 
integration, and financial commitment. From the perspective of economic development, 
a nation requires corporate governance institutions – or what might be called a system 
of corporate control – that support these three social conditions of innovative enterprise. 
In Section Four I outline, in a highly summary and stylized fashion, the systems of 
corporate control that have prevailed in a number of the developed nations over the past 
quarter-century or so, and the general implications of these different systems of 
corporate control for the employment and investment institutions that regulate the 
supplies of labor and capital to companies, as well as for the innovative performance of 
the national economies in which these corporations are based. My purpose in this 
section is to provide a framework, rooted in comparative history, which can guide 
further analysis of the characteristics of these institutions in different nations and at 
different times, and their implications for economic development. In the process, I also   3
demonstrate that there are many distinctive ‘varieties of capitalism’, characterized by 
different social conditions and related performance attributes, that can serve as models 
for economic development. 
Section Five concludes this paper with the implications of a theory of innovative 
enterprise for development policy. I argue that it is futile, and even dangerous, to try to 
shape corporate governance institutions to promote economic development if one does 
not understand the social conditions of innovative enterprise on which the processes and 
outcomes of economic development will ultimately depend. Furthermore, I contend that 
the relationship between corporate governance institutions and economic development 
should be understood for the developed nations before a less developed nation that 
seeks to join the ranks of the rich embarks on an institutional transformation designed to 
promote economic development. Otherwise such efforts remain vulnerable to the myth 
of the market economy and the ideology of maximizing shareholder value that builds on 
this myth. The aims of the theoretical framework presented in this paper are not only to 
ensure that attempts at institutional change comprehend the realities of economic 
development but also, in the process, to compel the myth-makers to confront the 
realities of economic development or, alternatively, keep their ideologies to themselves. 
2  The theory of shareholder value and the reality of innovative enterprise 
During the 1980s and 1990s the assumption that ‘good corporate governance’ meant 
‘maximizing shareholder value’ became widespread in the corporate governance 
debates. The theoretical foundation of this argument is that, in a developed, or ‘market’, 
economy, the existence of well-functioning markets in capital, labor, and products 
ensure the allocation of scarce economic resources to their best alternative uses to 
achieve the most efficient performance of the economy that is possible. Yet in apparent 
contradiction to this theory of the market economy, we observe that in developed 
economies business corporations are repositories of large, and in many cases vast, 
quantities of resources over which corporate managers, rather than markets, exercise 
allocative control. For adherents of the theory of the market economy, ‘market 
imperfections’ – for example, ‘asset specificity’ in the work of Oliver Williamson 
(1985; 1996) – necessitate this managerial control over the allocation of resources, thus 
creating an ‘agency problem’ for those ‘principals’ who have made investments in the 
firm.1 
The agency problem derives from two limitations on the human ability to make 
allocative decisions, one cognitive and the other behavioral. The cognitive limitation is 
‘hidden information’ (also known as ‘adverse selection’ or ‘bounded rationality’) that 
prevents investors from knowing a priori whether the managers whom they have 
employed as their agents are good or bad resource allocators. The behavioral limitation 
is ‘hidden action’ (also known as ‘moral hazard’ or ‘opportunism’) that reflects the 
proclivity, inherent in an individualistic society, of managers as agents to use their 
positions as resource allocators to pursue their own self-interests and not necessarily the 
interests of the firm’s principals. These managers may allocate corporate resources to 
                                                 
1   For a critique of the work of Williamson along the lines of this paper, see Lazonick 1991a: chs 6 and 
7; and 2002.   4
build their own personal empires regardless of whether the investments they make and 
the people they employ generate sufficient profits for the firm. Or they may hoard 
surplus cash or near-liquid assets within the corporation, thus maintaining control over 
uninvested resources, rather than distributing these extra revenues to those who have 
invested in the company. Or they may simply use their control over resource allocation 
to line their own pockets. According to agency theory, absent corporate governance 
institutions that promote the maximization of shareholder value, one should expect that 
managerial control will result in the inefficient allocation of resources. 
The manifestation of a movement toward the more efficient allocation of resources, it is 
argued, is a higher return to shareholders. But why is it shareholders for whom value 
should be maximized? Why not create more value for creditors by making their 
financial investments more secure, or for employees via higher wages and benefits, or 
communities via more corporate tax revenues? Neoclassical financial theorists argue 
that among all the stakeholders in the business corporation only shareholders are 
‘residual claimants’; the amount of returns that they receive, if any, depends on what is 
left over after all parties who have guaranteed contractual claims have been paid for 
their productive contributions to the firm.2 If the firm incurs a loss, the return to 
shareholders will, in principle, be negative, and vice versa. By this argument, 
shareholders are the only stakeholders who have an incentive to bear risk by investing in 
productive resources that may, or may not, generate a more efficient allocation of 
resources. As residual claimants, moreover, shareholders are the only stakeholders who 
have an interest in monitoring managers to ensure that they allocate resources in ways 
that are likely to lead to more efficient resource allocation. Indeed, the argument goes, 
precisely because public shareholders have no other relation to a company whose shares 
are traded on a stock exchange other than the fact that they hold its shares, and because, 
by the same token, they can easily reallocate their financial investments to other 
companies by selling those shares and buying others, they are deemed to be the 
participants in the economy who are best situated to reallocate resources to more 
efficient uses.3 
If, as this perspective argues, all participants in the firm except shareholders get 
contractual returns according to their productive contributions, it follows that the 
maximization of shareholder value is the maximization of value creation in the economy 
as a whole. The residual value that is created, which may well be negative rather than 
positive, is the return to shareholders for bearing risk. The agency problem – the fact 
that public shareholders as the (purported) ‘principals’ who bear risk have to leave the 
corporate allocation of resources under the control of managers as their ‘agents’ – poses 
a constant threat to this efficient allocation of resources. Within the shareholder 
paradigm, the stock market represents the corporate governance institution through 
which the agency problem can be resolved and the efficient allocation of the economy’s 
resources can be achieved. Specifically, the stock market can function as a ‘market for 
corporate control’ that enables shareholders to ‘disgorge the free cash flow’. As Michael 
Jensen, a leading academic proponent of maximizing shareholder value, has put it 
                                                 
2   This critique draws upon O’Sullivan 2000b and 2002, and Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000b. 
3   See O’Sullivan 2002 for a statement of the theory and an extended critique.   5
Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund all projects 
that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost 
of capital. Conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over 
payout policies are especially severe when the organization generates 
substantial free cash flow. The problem is how to motivate managers to 
disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below cost or wasting it on 
organization inefficiencies. (Jensen 1986: 323) 
How can managers be motivated to ‘disgorge the free cash flow’? If a company does 
not maximize shareholder value, a shareholder can sell his or her shares and, as an 
individual, reallocate the proceeds to what he or she deems to be more efficient uses. 
But the sale of shares does not in and of itself release any resources from the inefficient 
company concerned. It does, however, depress that company’s stock price, which in 
turn facilitates a takeover by shareholders who can put in place managers who are 
willing to distribute the ‘free cash flow’ to shareholders in the forms of higher dividends 
and/or stock repurchases. Better yet as Jensen (1986) argued, reflecting the corporate 
takeover movement of the 1980s, let corporate raiders use the market for corporate 
control for debt-financed takeovers, thus enabling shareholders to transform their 
corporate equities into corporate bonds. Thus corporate managers, whomever they may 
be, would be ‘bonded’ to distribute the ‘free cash flow’ in the form of interest rather 
than dividends.4 Additionally, as Jensen and Murphy (1990), among others, contended, 
the maximization of shareholder value could be achieved by giving corporate managers 
stock-based compensation, such as stock options, to align their own self-interests with 
those of shareholders. Then, even without the threat of a takeover, these managers 
would have a personal incentive to maximize shareholder value by only investing 
corporate revenues in those ‘projects that have positive net present values when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital’ (Jensen 1986: 323) and distributing the 
remainder of corporate revenues to shareholders in the forms of dividends and/or stock 
repurchases. 
During the 1980s and 1990s ‘maximizing shareholder value’ became the dominant 
ideology for corporate governance in the United States. Top managers of industrial 
corporations became ardent advocates of this position, and with their stock-based 
compensation, they reaped ample returns. The 1980s and 1990s witnessed an explosion 
in executive pay, driven by income from the exercise of stock options. Between 1980 
and 1994 the mean value of stock option grants to CEOs of large US corporations rose 
from $155,037 to $1,213,180, or by 683 percent, while the mean value of their salary 
and bonus compensation rose from $654,935 to $1,292,290 million, or by 95 percent. 
As a result, stock options accounted for 19 percent of CEO compensation in 1980, but 
48 percent in 1994 (Hall and Leibman 1998: 661). Hence, even before the Internet 
boom of the last half of the 1990s, top executives of US corporations had become inured 
to ‘maximizing shareholder value’. The sharp increases in stock prices in the boom 
further enriched these executives. In 2000 the average CEO compensation at the top 200 
US corporations by sales revenues was $11.3 million, of which stock options generated 
60 percent, restricted stock 11 percent, bonuses 18 percent, and salary 9 percent (Pearl 
Meyer 2001). 
                                                 
4   For a critique of these arguments, given the institutions that had governed the corporation in the 
previous century of US capitalist development, see Lazonick 1992.   6
Table 1. US corporate stock and bond yields, 1960-2005 
Average annual percent change 
  1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-05 
Real stock yield  6.63  -1.66 11.67 15.01 -1.87 
   Price yield  5.80  1.35  12.91  15.54  -0.76 
   Dividend yield  3.19  4.08  4.32  2.47  1.58 
   Change in CPI  2.36  7.09  5.55  3.00  2.67 
Real bond yield  2.65  1.14  5.79  4.72  3.60 
Notes:   Stock yields are for S&P's composite index of 500 US corporate stocks (about 75% of which are 
NYSE). Bond yields are for Moody's Aaa-rated US corporate bonds. 
Source:   Updated from Lazonick and O'Sullivan 2000a, using US Congress, Economic Report of the 
President 2006, tables B-62, B-73, B-95, B-96. 
During the decade of the 1970s the stock market had languished and inflation had 
eroded dividend yields. In the 1980 and 1990s, however, with ‘maximizing shareholder 
value’ as the new corporate ideology, high real yields on corporate stock characterized 
the US corporate economy as a whole (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000a). As can be seen 
in Table 1, these high yields came mainly from stock-price appreciation as distinct from 
dividends yields.5 These high price yields reflected a combination of three distinct 
forces at work in the US corporate economy: a) redistribution of corporate revenues 
from labor incomes to capital incomes, mainly by Old Economy industrial corporations, 
in the form of stock repurchases; b) innovation, especially by New Economy 
companies, that boosted earnings per share; and c) speculation  by stock market 
investors, encouraged, initially at least, by stock price increases due to redistribution 
and/or innovation. Let us examine each of these three sources of an ebullient stock 
market, and then, from that perspective, return to the question of whether it is valid to 
argue that maximizing shareholder value maximizes value creation for the economy as a 
whole. 
First, in the 1980s and 1990s Old Economy companies, many of which had their origins 
in the late nineteenth century, engaged in a process of redistributing corporate revenues 
from labor incomes to capital incomes. Engaging in what can be called a ‘downsize-
and-distribute’ allocation regime, these companies downsized their labor forces and 
increased the distribution of corporate revenues to shareholders (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000a). This allocation regime represented a reversal of a ‘retain-and-
reinvest’ regime that had characterized the resource allocation decisions of these 
                                                 
5   When a company’s stock price increases, its dividend yield – the amount of dividends paid out as a 
percentage of the stock price – will fall unless the amount of dividends paid out increases 
proportionately. During the 1990s the amount of dividends paid out by the US corporations increased 
by an annual average of just over eight percent (notwithstanding an absolute decline in dividends paid 
out of four percent in 1999, the first decline since 1975), while the payout ratio – the amount of 
dividends as a percentage of after-tax corporate profits – averaged 57 percent (compared with 39 
percent in the 1960s, 41 percent in the 1970s, and 48 percent in the 1980s). The rapid and persistent 
increases in stock prices, however, countervailed these increases in dividend payouts to maintain 
dividend yields at low levels relative to both what they had been before the 1980s and 1990s and to 
stock-price yields during the 1980s and 1990s (US Congress 2005, B-90).   7
companies in the post-Second World War decades; they had retained corporate revenues 
for reinvestment in organization and technology, expanding their labor forces in the 
process. Coming into the 1980s employees – both managerial and shop-floor workers – 
had expectations, based on over three decades of experience of ‘retain-and-reinvest’, of 
long-term employment with these corporations (Lazonick 2004a). 
Downsizing enhanced the ‘free cash flow’ that could be distributed to shareholders. In 
the early and mid-1980s, this redistribution of corporate revenues often occurred 
through debt-financed hostile takeovers, favored by the proponents of the ‘market for 
corporate control’ such as Jensen, in which downsizing enhanced the ability of 
corporate managers to service and retire the massive debt that their companies had taken 
on (see, for example, Shleifer and Summers 1988; Blair 1993). From the mid-1980s 
repurchases of corporate stock became an increasingly important form of the 
distribution of corporate revenues. Whereas prior to the 1980s Old Economy companies 
had distributed revenues to shareholders through quarterly dividend payments, from the 
mid-1980s these companies also ‘created value for shareholders’ by means of large-
scale and repeated stock buybacks that boosted stock prices. High price yields in the 
1980s and 1990s were to some extent a result of this redistribution process. 
Second, New Economy companies such as Intel, Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Sun 
Microsystems, and Oracle experienced significant growth in both revenues and 
employment during the 1980s and 1990s by means of a ‘retain-and-reinvest’ allocation 
regime; they retained corporate revenues, paying little if any dividends, and reinvested 
them in innovative products and processes. In general both the revenues and 
employment levels of these companies grew over this period, especially during the 
1990s, and these companies were highly profitable (see Lazonick 2006). It was the 
innovative successes of these companies that resulted in increases in their stock prices. 
Whereas it can be argued that Old Economy companies raised their stock prices through 
a redistribution process, New Economy companies did so as a result of an innovation 
process. The difference was that the innovation process created new value, which, to 
some extent at least, justified a higher stock price, whereas the redistribution process 
transferred value from labor incomes to capital incomes, raising stock prices even if no 
new value was created. 
Third, stock-market investors watched what these companies were doing, and when 
they thought that they could gain from stock price movements, speculated on how long 
and how high stock prices would rise. The combination of Old Economy redistribution 
and New Economy innovation provided a solid foundation for sustained stock price 
increases. But over certain periods (from the fourth quarter of 1985 to third quarter of 
1987, and from the first quarter of 1995 to the third quarter of 2000) speculation became 
an increasingly important factor in the rise of stock prices, with professional insiders, 
within corporations and on Wall Street, encouraging and generally gaining from this 
speculation, as there existed, it turned out, a long queue of unprofessional outsiders who 
bought shares at inflated prices, implicitly assuming that ‘greater fools’ than themselves 
remained in line ready to buy shares on the market.6 At some point, however, the 
                                                 
6   If, at any point in time, these speculative outsiders had recognized that they themselves had already 
been previous sellers’ ‘greater fools’, they might have been more concerned about how many still 
greater fools remained in line to buy their shares. In raising this concern, even less orthodox financial 
economists were not much help. The ‘behavioral’ school in financial economics has recognized the   8
greatest fools were left holding the over-priced shares, as happened in the fourth quarter 
of 1987 and, more profoundly, from the fourth quarter of 2000. Stock prices fell 
precipitously, and the speculation that helped to sustain the longest ‘bull run’ in US 
stock market history was (for the time being) put to rest.7 
Over the course of the bull run of the 1980s and 1990s, stock repurchases became an 
increasingly important mode of distributing corporate cash to shareholders, both 
absolutely and relative to dividends (Dittmar and Dittmar 2004). In 1984 repurchases 
represented 13.5 percent of the earnings of US corporations; dividends 35.8 percent. In 
1997 repurchases surpassed dividends, and in 1999 repurchases were 35.8 percent of 
earnings while dividends were 26.3 percent. The real value of repurchases was almost 
four times higher in 1999 than it had been 15 years earlier. A local peak in repurchases 
occurred in 1987 and 1988 when many companies – most notably IBM – stepped up 
their repurchasing activity after the October 1987 stock market crash (Carroll 1987; 
Maiden 1987). By the late 1990s large-scale repurchases had became a fact of financial 
life for many New Economy companies as well.  
Driving these stock repurchases were not only the desire of these companies to support 
their stock price but also the dilution of stockholdings from the use of broad-based 
employee stock option plans (Lazonick 2006). From the late 1930s US corporations had 
granted stock options to top executives, primarily as a tax dodge. The New Deal had 
created a highly progressive personal income tax structure, which in the 1940s and 
1950s took 91 percent of the marginal income of those, including top executives, in the 
highest tax brackets (Lazonick 2003a). The main attraction of stock options for these 
executives was the possibility that the income from them could be construed as capital 
gains, which were taxed at only 25 percent – a possibility that, after much lobbying, 
                                                                                                                                               
importance of stock market speculation as a determinant of stock prices, but has not in general 
embraced the ‘greater fools’ theory. For example, in a best-selling book published at the height of the 
boom, financial economist Robert Shiller (2000) characterized stock market bubbles as ‘irrational 
exuberance’. In that book, Shiller (2000: 18) made the assumption that all players on the stock market, 
professionals and non-professionals, have access to the same information. Yet, notwithstanding 
government regulation, the assumption is contradicted by widespread use of inside information by 
professionals, as revealed for example in the investigations of the New York State District Attorney, 
Eliot Spitzer, in the aftermath of the Internet crash, as well as in the documents produced in numerous 
class action lawsuits by shareholders who bought shares and allegedly lost money because of false 
information provided by professional insiders. Insofar as insiders have the incentive and ability to 
manipulate stock market prices for their own personal gain, their exuberance is anything but 
‘irrational’. Under the heading, ‘Cultural Changes Favoring Business Success or the Appearance 
Thereof’, Shiller (2000: 22-4) recognized, but in my view understated, the incentive that top corporate 
executives, as ultimate professional insiders, had to contribute to that speculation, given the 
importance of stock-based compensation to their pay packages. Ironically, after the crash, Michael 
Jensen, a leading academic proponent in the 1980s and 1990s of using stock-based compensation to 
align the interests of managers with shareholders, chastised corporate executives for falling to say ‘no’ 
to Wall Street, as, spurred on by the prospect of greater stock-based compensation, they took actions 
during the boom for the purpose of inflating stock prices (Fuller and Jensen 2002). See also the 
Fortune cover story that appeared in September 2002, entitled: ‘They bought. You sold: All over 
corporate America, top execs were cashing in stock even as their companies were tanking. Who was 
left holding the bag? You’. (Gimein et al. 2002) 
7   The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) rose by about 500 percent from 1921 to 1929; 950 percent 
from April 1942 to January 1966; and 1300 percent from July 1982 to August 2000. And during the 
boom of the late 1990s the NASDAQ index, dominated by New Economy and more speculative 
stocks, made the rise in DJIA look like a small blip (see Carpenter et al. 2003).   9
became a reality in the Revenue Act of 1950. From the 1960s, however, high-tech 
startups based in what would become known as Silicon Valley began to use stock 
options to lure technical and administrative personnel away from secure careers with 
established companies, and subsequently as a mode of compensation for competing for 
these employees among themselves. As a result by the 1980s and 1990s broad-based 
employee stock options became widespread among New Economy high-tech 
companies, and in the late 1990s spread to many Old Economy companies throughout 
the United States and even abroad that had to compete for this highly mobile labor 
(Lazonick 2003a; Carpenter et al. 2003; Glimstedt and Lazonick 2005). One result was 
that, while top executives continued to get the lion’s share of stock options, a broad base 
of the high-tech labor force, especially in high-tech industries, acquired an interest in 
corporate policies aimed at ‘maximizing shareholder value’. 
But did this financial behavior lead to a more efficient allocation of resources in the 
economy, as the proponents of maximizing shareholder value claim? There are a 
number of flaws in agency theory that raise serious doubts about the usefulness of this 
perspective for analyzing the relation between corporate governance and economic 
performance. These flaws have to do with a) a failure to explain how corporations came 
to control the allocation of significant accounts of the economy’s resources in the first 
place; b) how, at any point in time, one measures the ‘free cash flow’; and c) the claim 
that it is only shareholders who have residual claimant status. All of these flaws stem 
from the facts that agency theory, like neoclassical economic theory on which it is 
based, is rooted in a theory of the market economy and, as a result, lacks of a theory of 
innovative enterprise. All of these flaws are, moreover, amply exposed by the history of 
the industrial corporation in the United States, the national context in which agency 
theory evolved and in which, first and foremost, it is thought to be applicable.  
First, agency theory makes an argument for taking resources out of the control of 
inefficient managers without explaining how, historically, these corporations became 
the repositories of such vast amounts of resources over which these managers could 
exercise control. The fact is that from the first decades of the twentieth century the 
separation of share ownership from managerial control characterized US industrial 
corporations (Berle and Means 1932; Chandler 1977). The companies that occupied 
dominant positions in the US economy coming into the last half of the century were 
those that had been innovative in the first half. During the post-Second World War 
decades, however, many of these industrial corporations grew to be too big, especially 
during the conglomeration movement of the 1960s. Top managers responsible for the 
allocation of resources to innovative investment strategies became segmented, 
cognitively and behaviorally, from the organizations that would have to implement 
these strategies. In the 1970s and 1980s, moreover, many of these US corporations 
faced intense foreign competition, especially from innovative Japanese corporations 
characterized by a separation of share ownership from managerial control. What these 
US corporations required to make an innovative response was corporate governance 
institutions that would reintegrate strategic decision-makers with the business 
organizations over which they exercised allocative control. Instead, guided by the 
ideology of ‘maximizing shareholder value’ and rewarded with stock options, what 
these established corporations got were managers whose prime objective was to boost 
their companies’ stock prices, even if it was accomplished by a redistribution of 
corporate revenues from labor incomes to capital incomes and even if it further 
undermined the effectiveness of the productive capabilities that these companies had 
accumulated from the past (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000b).   10
Second, agency theory does not address how, at any point in time, one can judge that 
managers are allocating resources inefficiently when a firm has to invest in innovation 
to remain competitive. An innovative investment strategy is inherently uncertain. Any 
strategic manager who allocates resources to an innovative strategy faces three types of 
uncertainty: technological uncertainty, market uncertainty, and competitive uncertainty. 
Technological uncertainty exists because the firm may be incapable of developing the 
higher quality processes and products envisaged in its innovative investment strategy; if 
one already knew how to generate a new product or process at the outset of the 
investment, it would not be innovation. Market uncertainty exists because, even if the 
firm is successful in its development effort, future reductions in product prices and 
increases in factor prices may lower the returns that can be generated by the 
investments. Moreover, the innovative enterprise must access a large enough extent of 
the product market to transform the fixed costs of developing a new technology into low 
units costs. Like transforming technology, accessing the market is an integral part of the 
innovation process, and, at the time when resources are committed to an innovative 
strategy, it is impossible to be certain, even probabilistically, about what extent of the 
market will be accessed. Finally, even if a firm overcomes technological and market 
uncertainty, it still faces competitive uncertainty: the possibility that an innovative 
competitor will have invested in a strategy that generates an even higher quality, lower 
cost product. One can state formulaicly, as Jensen does, that the firm should only invest 
in ‘projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the relevant cost of 
capital’. But anyone who contends (as such a statement does) that, when committing 
resources to an innovative investment strategy, one can foresee the stream of future 
earnings that are required for the calculation of net present value knows nothing about 
the innovation process. It is far more plausible to argue that if corporate managers really 
sought to ‘maximize shareholder value’ according to this formula, they would never 
contemplate investing in innovative projects with their highly uncertain returns (see, for 
example, Baldwin and Clark 1992).  
Third, it is simply not the case that all participants in the corporation other than 
shareholders receive contractually guaranteed returns from the corporation according to 
the productive contributions that they make. The argument that shareholders are the sole 
‘residual claimants’ is a deduction from the theory of the market economy that does not 
accord with the reality of successful economic development. The neoclassical 
economist assumes that every input into the production process is paid a market price 
that reflects its productive contribution and that can be specified in a contract. One can 
assume that such is the case when, in an open, competitive market, one business 
enterprise purchases a physical commodity as a productive input from another business 
enterprise. But, as I shall elaborate below, one cannot assume that such is the case when 
the inputs are made available to business enterprises by the state. Nor can one assume 
that such is the case when the inputs are made available to the business enterprise in the 
form of the labor services of employees. Finally, once one recognizes that the 
innovative enterprise cannot be understood as a ‘nexus of contracts’, one can ask 
whether public shareholders actually perform the risk-bearing function that the 
proponents of agency theory claim they do. In concluding this section of the paper, I 
shall explain why the basic assumptions of agency theory are contradicted by a realistic 
analysis of the roles of the state, labor, and shareholders in a business corporation that, 
by means of innovation, contributes to economic development. The general implication 
that I shall draw from this perspective is that if one wants to understand the relation 
between corporate governance institutions and economic development, one needs to   11
proceed on the basis of innovation theory rather than agency theory. Accordingly, 
Section Three of the paper will sketch out a theory of innovative enterprise, as a prelude 
to an examination of the ‘social conditions of innovative enterprise’ in cross-national 
and historical perspective contained in Section Four. 
Any realistic account of the role of the corporation in economic development must take 
into account the role of the state in making infrastructural investments for the purpose of 
generating knowledge that, given the levels of financial commitment required and 
uncertainty of the economic outcomes, no business enterprise would have made on its 
own. A government that plays this role is called a ‘developmental state’, a term that 
became popular in the 1980s to describe the role of the state in Japanese development 
(Johnson 1982; 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999). Yet, the study of the history of economic 
development in the twentieth century shows that, in terms of investment in new 
knowledge with applications to industry, it is the United States that can lay claim to 
having been the world’s foremost developmental state. As a prime example, US 
dominance in computers, microelectronics, software, and data communications is 
impossible to explain without recognizing the role of government in making both 
seminal investments that developed new knowledge and infrastructural investments that 
diffused that knowledge.8 
The US government made investments to augment the productive power of the nation 
through government, corporate, and university research labs that generated new 
knowledge as well as through educational institutions that developed the capabilities of 
the labor force of the future. Business enterprises made ample use of this knowledge 
and capability. While these business enterprises may have had to pay fees for these 
services – for example, the salary of an engineer whose education was supported in 
whole or in part by state funds – one would be hard put to show that there existed a 
nexus of contracts that guaranteed the state a return on these investments for the 
productive contributions that the outputs of these investments made to the enterprises 
that used them. In effect, in funding these investments, the state (or more correctly, its 
body of taxpayers) was bearing the risk that the nation’s business enterprises would 
further develop and utilize this productive capability in a way that would ultimately 
redound to the benefit of the nation, with the ‘return’ to the nation in no way 
contractually guaranteed. In addition, in the name of national economic development, 
the US government often provided cash subsidies to business enterprises to develop new 
products and processes or even to start new firms. Sometimes the government built 
these subsidies into the rates that business enterprises in particular industries could 
charge as regulated monopolies. And for selected industries, it created these subsidies 
through tariff protection that permitted firms in these industries time to develop higher 
quality, lower cost products. The public funded these investments and subsidies through 
current taxes, borrowing against the future, and by making consumers pay higher prices 
for services than would have otherwise prevailed. 
                                                 
8   A list of references on the role of the US government in technology development could fill a book. 
For a start, see Braun and MacDonald 1982; Smith 1987; Flamm 1987; 1988; Kash 1989; Mowery 
and Rosenberg 1989; 1993; Hughes 1990; 1998; Ferleger and Lazonick 1993; 1994; Leslie 1993; 
Mowery and Langlois 1996; Norberg and O’Neill 1996; National Academy Press, 1999; Abbate 2000; 
Steil et al. 2002; and the references therein.   12
Multitudes of business enterprises benefited from these investments and subsidies 
without having to enter into contracts with the public bodies that had financed these 
investments to remit to them a guaranteed return for the productive contributions that 
the investments and subsidies supplied. Indeed, by definition, a ‘subsidy’ lies beyond 
the realm of a market-mediated contract; for example, one dictionary defines ‘subsidy’ 
as ‘a grant paid by a government to an enterprise that benefits the public’.9 That 
definition leaves open the question of how the enterprises that receive the subsidies are 
governed to ensure that the public actually benefits, including the extent of the benefits 
and the forms in which they accrue. There are no easy answers to such questions since, 
where innovation is involved, it may take decades to generate the benefits of the public 
subsidy. Without a guaranteed contractual obligation on the part of the enterprises 
whose revenues are thereby augmented to distribute these benefits to the original 
investors, political processes, especially those related to public finance, will influence 
the actual distribution of returns. It is a question of not only how the returns on past 
government investments and subsidies are distributed but also what type of new 
government investments and business subsidies are now demanded to regenerate the 
innovation process.10 
Like the government, workers can – and where the accumulation of knowledge is 
concerned generally do – also find themselves in the position of having made 
investments in productive capabilities that they supply to firms without a guaranteed 
contractual return. In an important contribution to the corporate governance debate, 
Margaret Blair (1995) argued that, alongside a firm’s shareholders, workers should be 
accorded ‘residual claimant’ status because they make investments in ‘firm-specific’ 
human capital at one point in time with the expectation, but no contractual guarantee, of 
reaping returns on those investment over the course of their careers. Moreover, insofar 
as their human capital is indeed ‘firm-specific’ these workers are dependent on their 
current employer for generating returns on their investments, with their lack of interfirm 
labor mobility increasing the risk that they bear. Blair goes on to argue that if one 
assumes, as the proponents of shareholder value do, that only shareholders bear risk and 
hence have sole ‘residual claimant’ status, there will be an underinvestment in human 
capital to the detriment of not only workers but the economy as a whole. 
Blair’s general point is correct; workers do make investments in long-lived productive 
capabilities – that is, human capital – without a contractually guaranteed return, but with 
the expectation of being able to earn incomes on the basis of those capabilities over the 
course of their working lives. Such is particularly the case when, as part of a collective 
effort, they apply their capabilities to engage in organizational learning to develop new 
                                                 
9   http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=subsidy 
10  The semiconductor industry was a prime recipient of government funding from the late 1940s. Yet 
even more than a half century later (in March 2005, as I was writing this paper), there were renewed 
calls from the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) for public funding of basic research in the 
physical sciences to assure continued US technology leadership in the industry. The spokesman for 
the SIA at a Washington, DC press conference was the CEO of Micron Technology, a leading US 
semiconductor company, and accompanying him at the press conference were the CEO of Intel, the 
president of the SIA (himself a former semiconductor executive), and a well-known neoclassical 
economist. See ‘Semiconductor Industry Association says U.S. could lose race for nanotechnology 
leadership; U.S. standard of living, national security linked to leadership’, Business Wire, 16 March 
2005.   13
products and processes that, if successful as innovations, will generate high returns for 
the firms that control those innovations in years, or even decades, to come. It is in this 
sense that their investments are ‘firm-specific’;11 through their involvement in 
organizational learning processes, they endow the firm with intellectual property 
without any contractual guarantee that they will be able to appropriate a portion of the 
returns on that investment if and when such returns accrue. As a result their ability to 
reap returns on that human capital is at risk if, having made the investment, they are 
deprived of employment with the firm when the gains from innovation are being reaped. 
For those who were concerned about the propensity of US corporations in the 1980s and 
1990s to ‘downsize-and-distribute’, Blair’s focus in investments on firm-specific human 
capital provided an apparently logical argument for a ‘stakeholder’ theory of the firm in 
which workers as well as shareholders should be viewed as ‘principals’ for whose 
benefit the firm should be run. 
The problem with the stakeholder argument, as with the shareholder argument, is that it 
provides no guidance for how the firm should be governed if, in the presence of changes 
in technology, markets, and competition, it is to remain innovative. While fully 
accepting Blair’s ‘stakeholder’ amendment to the shareholder argument, a corporate 
executive who is intent on downsizing his labor force could logically argue that the 
productive capabilities of workers in, say, their 50s who had made investments in ‘firm-
specific’ human capital earlier in their careers have now become old  because of 
competition from equally adept but more energetic younger workers or, alternatively, 
obsolete because of technological change. The executive could then argue that, in 
making investments in ‘firm-specific’ human capital in the past, these (now) older 
workers had taken on the risk-bearing function, and like any risk-bearing investor had to 
accept the possibility that their human capital would at some point lose its market value. 
The workers could respond by arguing that the corporate executive is wrong; that their 
accumulated capabilities are not old and obsolete, but rather, given a correct 
understanding of technological, market, and competitive conditions in the industry, 
remain critical to the innovation process. They might even, as ‘principals’, accuse the 
executive, as their ‘agent’, of acting opportunistically, perhaps because he has stock 
options that align his interests with shareholders, and that what the proposed downsizing 
entails is a redistribution of value from labor to capital rather then a restructuring of the 
workforce for the purpose of innovation. Clearly, even from the workers’ point of view, 
agency theory’s concerns with hidden information and hidden action on the part of 
managers are relevant. The problem is that agency theory provides no guide to 
analyzing whether or not the executive is in fact acting innovatively or opportunistically 
because agency theory, like neoclassical theory more generally, has no theory of 
innovative enterprise. 
As for public shareholders, from the perspective of innovative enterprise, what is the 
logic of the agency theorist’s claim that they are ‘residual claimants’ who bear the risk 
of investment in the corporate economy? The fundamental problem with this claim is 
that it entails a conception of investment that results in superior economic performance 
that cannot possibly result in innovation. Investments that can result in innovation 
                                                 
11  For a critique of the way in which economists have used the concept of ‘firm-specific’ human capital, 
and in particular of their inability to specify what is ‘firm-specific’ about it, see Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan 2000b.   14
require the strategic  allocation of productive resources to particular processes to 
transform particular productive inputs into higher quality, lower cost products than 
those goods or services that were previously available at prevailing factor prices. 
Investment in innovation is a direct investment that involves, first and foremost, a 
strategic confrontation with technological, market, and competitive uncertainty. Those 
who have the abilities and incentives to allocate resources to innovation must decide, in 
the face of uncertainty, what types of investments in organizational learning have the 
potential to generate higher quality, lower cost products. Then they must mobilize 
committed finance to sustain the innovation process until it generates the higher quality, 
lower cost products that permit financial returns.  
What role do public shareholders play in this innovation process? Do they confront 
uncertainty by strategically allocating resources to innovative investments? No, as 
portfolio investors, they diversify their financial holdings across the outstanding shares 
of existing firms in order to minimize risk. They do so, moreover, with limited liability, 
which means that they need not necessarily spend any time or effort in actually 
analyzing the innovative capabilities of the firms whose shares they hold. To be sure, 
they can rely on someone else whose job it is to do such an analysis, but in doing so 
they confirm their status as outsiders, and open themselves up to manipulation by 
insiders; that is, they simply shift the locus of the agency problem from managers to 
analysts. But even if they are able to evaluate with confidence the innovative investment 
strategy of any given firm in their investment portfolio, as public shareholders their only 
recourse if they do not like what they see is to sell their shares (what has long been 
called the ‘Wall Street walk’), which is precisely what the existence of a highly liquid 
stock market allows them to do. 
But for this ability to exit an investment easily, public shareholders would not be public 
shareholders; they would not be willing to hold shares of companies over whose assets 
they exercise no direct control. It is the liquidity of a public shareholder’s portfolio 
investment that differentiates it from a direct investment, and indeed makes the public 
shareholder a totally different economic actor than a private shareholder who, for lack 
of liquidity of his or her shares, must remain committed to his or her direct investment 
until it generates financial returns. It is in this sense that the modern corporation entails 
a fundamental transformation in the character of private property, as Adolph Berle and 
Gardiner Means (1932) recognized in their classic book on the separation of ownership 
and control written over 70 years ago. As property owners, public shareholders own 
tradable shares in a company that has invested in real assets; they do not own the assets 
themselves.  
Indeed, it can be argued, certainly on the basis of US experience (see O’Sullivan 
2003a), that the fundamental role of the stock market in the twentieth century has been 
to transform illiquid claims into liquid claims on the basis of investments that have 
already been made, and thereby separate share ownership from managerial control. 
Business corporations sometimes do use the stock market as a source of finance for new 
investment, although it would appear from the research of Mary O’Sullivan (2003a) that 
this function is most common in periods of stock market speculation when the lure for 
public shareholders to allocate resources to new issues may be the prospect of quickly 
‘flipping’ their shares to make a rapid, speculative return. Public shareholders want 
financial liquidity; investments in innovation require financial commitment. It is only by 
ignoring the role of innovation in the economy, and the necessary role of insider control 
in the strategic allocation of corporate resources to innovation, that agency theory can   15
argue that superior economic performance can be achieved by maximizing the value of 
those actors in the corporate economy who are the ultimate outsiders to the innovation 
process. 
As I shall elaborate in the next section, based as agency theory is in the neoclassical 
theory of the ‘optimizing’ firm, it provides no framework for analyzing who, for the 
sake of innovation, should exercise strategic control over corporate resource allocation, 
what types of investments in innovative capabilities they should make, and how for the 
sake of a renewal of the innovation process the returns from investments should be 
distributed (O’Sullivan 2000b). Yet the answers to these ‘who’, ‘what’, and ‘how’ 
questions are fundamental to any theory of resource allocation in the corporate 
economy. Studies of the innovation process demonstrate that it is uncertain, collective, 
and cumulative (O’Sullivan 2000b).  
Given the uncertain character of the innovation process, it matters who the strategic 
decision-makers are because their particular abilities and incentives will influence the 
types of resource allocation decisions that they make. To allocate resources to 
innovative investment strategies, these strategic decision-makers must have an intimate 
understanding of the technological, market, and competitive conditions of the industry 
in which they are involved, and an incentive to confront the uncertainty inherent in the 
innovation process rather than avoid it. Given the collective character of the innovation 
process, it matters what kinds of investments those who allocate the firm’s resources 
make. As we shall see, the key to innovation is investment in integrated skill bases that 
can engage in organizational learning, and the types of organizations that generate 
innovation vary across industry and nation as well as, within a particular industry and 
nation, over time. Finally, given the cumulative character of the innovation process, it 
matters  how the returns from prior investments are distributed, both to sustain the 
financing of innovation processes still in progress and to finance new innovative 
investment strategies. Given the characteristics of the innovation process, a theory of 
innovative enterprise requires a framework for analyzing the interactions of strategy, 
organization, and finance in the generation of higher quality, lower cost products. 
3  The theory of innovative enterprise 
Strategizing, organizing, and financing in alternative theories of the firm 
The business enterprise seeks to transform productive resources into goods and services 
that can be sold to generate revenues. A theory of the firm, therefore, must, at a 
minimum, provide explanations for how this productive transformation occurs and how 
revenues are obtained. These explanations must focus on three generic activities in 
which the business enterprise engages: strategizing, organizing, and financing. 
Strategizing  allocates resources to investments in developing human and physical 
capabilities that, it is hoped, will enable the firm to compete for chosen product markets. 
Organizing transforms technologies and accesses markets, and thereby develops and 
utilizes the value-creating capabilities of these resources to generate products that 
buyers want at prices that they are willing to pay. Financing sustains the process of 
developing technologies and accessing markets from the time at which investments in   16
productive resources are made to the time at which financial returns are generated 
through the sale of products.  
The neoclassical theory of the firm, which can be found in any economics textbook (see 
the left-hand side of Figure 1), trivializes the content of these three generic activities. 
Strategizing about the industry in which the firm should compete and the quantity of 
output that the firm should produce is determined by the rule of profit maximization – a 
rule that is imposed on the firm by given technological and market constraints. 
Organizing the firm to compete in the industry in which it has invested is determined by 
exogenous production functions and factor prices. The management of the firm reduces 
to an exercise in ‘substitution at the margin’ in the choice of its profit-maximizing 
output. Financing the transformation of productive resources into revenue-generating 
products is non-problematic because the theory assumes that, at each and every point in 
time, the firm can borrow capital at the prevailing market rate and can sell all of the 
output that maximizes its profits, covering the cost of capital.  
While the neoclassical theory of the firm trivializes the problems of strategy, 
organization, and finance, the particular formulation of the theory by post-Marshallian 
economists from the 1920s embodied a number of realistic assumptions about the 
factors that would influence the relation between the costs of production and the amount 
of output produced. These realistic assumptions have made the theory credible as a 
depiction of the way in which an actual firm operates. Analytically, these assumptions 
have provided the basis for a reasoned account of why the firm might have a U-shaped 
cost curve that, through the profit-maximization rule, enables it to choose an optimal 
level of output. The problem is, however, that the optimizing firm is not an innovating 
firm; indeed it might well be characterized as an un-innovating firm. 
 














Technological and market conditions given by cost and revenue functions.    
The “good manager” optimizes  subject to technological and market constraints. 
Through strategy, organization, & finance, innovating firm transforms technologies and markets to 
generate higher quality, lower cost  products. There is no “optimal” output or “optimal” price.
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In terms of strategy, the theory of the optimizing firm posits that an ‘entrepreneur’ 
chooses the industry in which he wants to compete by allocating resources to any 
industry in which, because of the exogenous appearance of a disequilibrium condition, 
there are supernormal profits to be made. The disequilibrium condition disappears as 
entrepreneurs reallocate resources to this particular industry, and, as long as equilibrium 
conditions persist across all industries, there will be no incentive for the entrepreneur to 
shift resources from one industry to another. 
There are two assumptions of the neoclassical theory of the firm that limit its ability to 
understand innovative enterprise. First, the neoclassical theory assumes that the 
entrepreneur plays no role in creating the disequilibrium condition that triggers the 
reallocation of resources from one industry to another. In the theory of the innovating 
firm, by contrast, entrepreneurs create new profitable opportunities, and thereby disrupt 
equilibrium conditions.12 Second, the neoclassical theory assumes that the entrepreneur 
requires no special expertise to compete in one industry rather than another. All that is 
required of the entrepreneur is that he follow the principle of profit maximization in the 
choice of industry in which to compete.13 In the theory of the innovating firm, however, 
the entrepreneur’s specialized knowledge of the industry in which he chooses to 
compete is of utmost importance for his firm’s ability to be innovative in that industry. 
Once the industry has been chosen, the neoclassical theory assumes that there are 
certain fixed costs, exogenously determined by existing technology and prevailing 
factor prices, that must be incurred by each and every firm that chooses to compete in 
the industry. These fixed costs are typically attributed to lumpy investments in plant and 
equipment, although it is also sometimes recognized that the entrepreneur’s salary 
represents an element of fixed costs. These costs are fixed because they are incurred 
even if the firm produces no output. As the firm expands its output, the average cost 
curve slopes downward as fixed costs are spread over a larger volume of output. The 
limiting assumption here is that the entrepreneur does not choose the firm’s level of 
fixed costs and the particular productive capabilities embodied in them as part of his 
firm’s investment strategy. In the theory of the innovating firm, the level of fixed costs 
manifests strategic decisions to make investments that are intended to endow the firm 
with distinctive productive capabilities compared with its competitors in the industry 
(see the right-hand side of Figure 1). 
                                                 
12    This entrepreneurial disruption of the ‘circular flow’ was Schumpeter’s basic contribution to the 
theory of the innovating firm in The Theory of Economic Development (1934). Over the course of his 
career, Schumpeter came to see the entrepreneurial function as a collective rather than individual 
endeavor. 
13  In a manner consistent with neoclassical theory, Austrians such as Israel Kirzner (1997) define the 
entrepreneur as one of the first to notice the appearance of disequilibrium conditions somewhere in the 
economic system. Hence he is among the first to reallocate resources from one use to another to take 
advantage of the existence of supernormal profits during the fleeting period during which these 
supernormal profits exist. His reallocation of resources to capture these supernormal profits begins the 
process of reducing them to normal levels, thus re-establishing equilibrium conditions. But the 
Austrians make no attempt to explain why disequilibrium conditions in the first place; their 
‘entrepreneur’ is in effect an arbitrageur, who has little in common with the Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur whose actions create disequilibrium conditions, and who Schumpeter (1965) recognized 
could have motives other than profits and could even be a representative of the state.   18
Given the firm’s fixed costs, the entrepreneur purchases that quantity of complementary 
variable inputs at prevailing factor prices in accordance with the technological 
requirements of the amount of output at which profits are maximized. Thus variable 
costs per unit of output are added to the fixed costs per unit of output to yield total unit 
costs, with the average cost curve mapping these total unit costs for different levels of 
output. If variable costs were to remain constant as output expands, the average cost 
curve would slope downwards continuously (although at a declining rate) as fixed costs 
are spread over more units of output. 
At this point, however, the neoclassical theory makes a critical assumption that causes 
the average cost curve to change direction and slope upwards, thus yielding the well-
known U-shaped cost curve. The assumption is that the addition of variable factors of 
production to the firm’s fixed factors of production results in a declining average 
productivity of these combined factors (that is, the firm’s technology, which is also the 
industry’s technology). In deriving the U-shaped cost curve, neoclassical theorists give 
two quite plausible reasons why average productivity declines as output expands. Both 
reasons assume that the key variable factor is labor. One reason is that as more variable 
factors are added to the fixed factors, increasingly crowded factory conditions reduce 
the productivity of each variable factor as, for example, workers continuously bump into 
one other. The other reason is that as more workers are added to the production process, 
the entrepreneur, as the fixed factor whose role it is to organize productive activities, 
experiences a ‘control loss’ because of the increasing number of workers that he has to 
supervise and monitor. 
Hence organization – in this case the relation between the entrepreneur as manager and 
the work force that he employs – becomes central to the neoclassical theory of the firm. 
Within the theory of the optimizing firm, the constraining assumption is that the 
entrepreneur passively accepts this condition of increasing costs, and optimizes subject 
to it as a constraint. In sharp contrast, in the theory of the innovating firm, the 
experience of increasing costs, as shown on the left-hand side of Figure 2, provides the 
firm’s strategic decision-makers with an understanding of the limits of the initial 
investment strategy, and with that information they make additional new investments 
for the strategic purpose of taking control of the variable factor that was the source of 
increasing costs.14 An innovating firm would not take a condition of overcrowding or 
control loss that results in increasing costs as a ‘given constraint’, but rather would 
make investments in organization and technology to change this condition. In effect, for 
the sake of improving its capability of developing and utilizing productive resources, 
the firm makes strategic investments that transform variable costs into fixed costs, 
which the firm must now try to transform into low unit costs. 
What is the role of finance in the theory of the optimizing firm? A firm needs to finance 
fixed-cost investments because, by definition, the returns from these investments are 
generated over time. The theory of the optimizing firm posits that, at any given point in 
time, the firm can sell all the output that it wants according to a known industry demand 
schedule. Hence, in theory, there are no risks entailed in the financing of investments 
over the period of time that it takes to amortize the investments. The cost of capital is 
built into the firm’s cost structure, and simply reflects the market price of finance. 
                                                 
14  For an elaboration of this argument, see Lazonick 1991a: ch. 3; and 1993.   19
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Through innovative strategy , IE expects to 
outcompete OF.  But, in period one, IE’s 
strategy only results in high unit costs, and 
IE remains at a competitive disadvantage.  
Neoclassical theorists have recognized the adjustment problem that faces an industry 
when there is a reduction in demand. With market prices depressed, some firms should 
exit the industry. But given the assumption that all firms in the industry have identical 
cost structures, it is not clear why some firms would drop out of the industry, leaving 
other firms to enjoy the restoration of ‘normal’ profits. Rather all firms in the industry, 
viewing their fixed costs as sunk costs, continue to produce at the profit-maximizing 
level as long as the market price at least enables them to cover their variable costs. 
Under such conditions of ‘cut-throat competition’, firms in effect live off their existing 
investments while they lack the prospective returns to justify the financing of new 
investments (see Reynolds 1940 for a classic article). 
In contrast, in the theory of the innovating firm, the uncertainty inherent in fixed costs is 
central to the analysis rather than being a by-product of ad hoc concessions to reality. 
The theory of the innovating firm assumes that the investments that the firm makes must 
be developed and utilized over time, as the firm transforms technologies and accesses 
markets, before returns from those investments can be generated, or indeed before the 
rate of return can even be known. The problem is not, as in the theory of the optimizing 
firm, whether the prevailing return on investment provided by existing technological 
and market conditions will continue in the future. Since the return on investments 
depends on the extent of the market that the innovating firm actually attains, a return on 
investment does not even prevail in the present, that is, at the time when the investments 
in innovation are made. Investments in innovation must be made despite the existence 
of technological, market, and competitive uncertainties – discussed in the previous 
section of this paper – concerning prospective returns. The optimizing firm may 
calculate, on the basis of prior experience, the risk of a deterioration of current market 
conditions, but it has no way on contemplating, let alone calculating, the uncertainty of 
returns for conditions of supply and demand that, because innovation is involved, have 
yet to be created.  
The fact, moreover, that the optimizing firm will only finance investments for which an 
adequate return already exists creates an opportunity for the innovating firm to make   20
innovative investments that, if successful, can enable it to outcompete optimizing firms. 
Indeed, in the future optimizing firms may find that the cause of the ‘poor market 
conditions’ that they face is not the result of an exogenous shift in the industry demand 
curve but rather the result of competition from innovating firms that have gained 
competitive advantage while their own managers happily optimized (as indeed the 
economics textbooks instructed them to do) subject given technological and market 
constraints. 
The monopoly model and the innovating firm 
Are the theories of the optimizing and innovating firm, therefore, inherently in conflict 
with one another? Certainly they describe two very different types of firm behavior; one 
type makes change and is dynamic, while the other type ignores change and is static. 
But from an intellectual point of view, as I shall demonstrate, the static theory of the 
optimizing firm can serve as a point of departure for a dynamic theory of the innovating 
firm. One ‘simply’ drops the optimizing assumptions by allowing the innovating firm to 
make investments to overcome technological and market conditions that its optimizing 
competitors accept as given constraints. That point of departure, however, then requires 
one to adopt an entirely different methodology for studying the allocation of resources 
in an economy – a methodology that that I call ‘historical transformation’ in contrast to 
constrained optimization (see Lazonick 2002b). When employing a historical 
transformation methodology, theory ceases to be a formula for deducing optimal 
outcomes; rather it becomes an iterative intellectual process that distils the essence of 
what we already know and thereby provides systematic focus to the discovery of what 
we need to know. 
Over the past century or so, neoclassical economists have chosen not to move in this 
direction (for some reasons why, see Lazonick 1991a and 1991b). Instead they have 
preferred to remain within the realm of constrained optimization in their search for 
equilibrium conditions of output and price. Rather than compare the conditions that 
govern the allocation of resources in optimizing firms and innovating firms, they have 
compared the optimizing firm operating under conditions of ‘perfect competition’ with 
the optimizing firm operating under conditions of ‘monopoly’. The existence of the 
monopoly model has provided the theoretical foundation for the contention, deeply 
embedded in public policy discourse, that optimization under conditions of perfect 
competition results in the best possible allocation of resources. From this perspective, 
economists advocate anti-monopoly policies that rely upon market competition to 
resolve problems that arise in the efficient allocation of resources.  
Within the framework of the theory of the optimizing firm, the condition of monopoly 
results in lower industry output and higher industry price than would prevail under the 
condition of perfect competition (see the left-hand side of Figure 3). The comparison of 
constrained optimization under conditions of perfect competition and monopoly 
contains, however, a fundamental flaw. The problem is not with the internal logic of the 
constrained optimization model per se, be it in its competitive or monopoly form. 
Rather the problem is with the logic of comparing the competitive model with the 
monopoly model within the constrained-optimization framework. 
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Figure 3. The flaw in the monopoly model 
Monopoly means lower output and
higher prices = inferior performance.
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If technological and market conditions make perfect competition a possibility, how can 
one firm (or even a small number of firms) come to dominate an industry? One would 
have to assume that the monopolist somehow differentiated itself from other 
competitors in the industry. But, the constrained-optimization comparison that yields the 
monopoly model argues that both the monopolist firm and perfectly competitive firms 
optimize subject to the same cost structures that derive from given technological and 
factor-market conditions. Indeed, except for the assumption that in one case the firm can 
make its profit-maximizing output decision as if it can sell all of its output at a constant 
price (according to a perfectly elastic demand curve) and that in the other case the firm 
is so large that it can only sell more output at a lower price (according to a downward 
sloping demand curve), there is absolutely nothing in terms of the structure or operation 
of the firm that distinguishes the perfect competitor from the monopolist! So how would 
monopoly ever emerge under such conditions?15 For a discipline that prides itself on its 
                                                 
15 The now-standard comparison of perfect competition and monopoly within the theory of the 
optimizing firm was elaborated by the followers of Alfred Marshall, building on Books V and VI of 
Principles of Economics, first published in 1890 and revised in eight editions up to 1920. Yet Marshall 
(1961: 484-5) himself recognized that a situation where one firm dominated an industry would not 
necessarily yield inferior economic outcomes than an industrial structure based on perfectly 
competitive firms. As he put it explicitly (with my emphasis): ‘The monopolist would lose all his 
monopoly revenue if he produced for sale an amount so great that its supply, as here defined, was 
equal to its demand price: the amount which gives the maximum monopoly revenue is always 
considerably less than that. It may therefore appear as though the amount produced under a monopoly 
is always less and its price to the consumer always higher than if there were no monopoly. But this is 
not the case. For when the production is all in the hands of one person or company, the total expenses 
involved are generally less than would have to be incurred if the same aggregate production were 
distributed among a multitude of comparatively small rival producers. They would have to struggle 
with one another for the attention of the consumers, and would necessarily spend in the aggregate a 
great deal more on advertising in all its various forms than a single firm would; and they would be less 
able to avail themselves of the many various economies which result from production on a large scale.   22
use of logical analysis, the comparison between monopoly and perfect competition 
represents an enormous logical error. It is an error that, in Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy, prompted Joseph Schumpeter (1950: 106) to state: 
What we have got to accept is that [the large-scale enterprise] has come 
to be the most powerful engine of [economic] progress and in particular 
of the long-run expansion of total output not only in spite of, but to a 
considerable extent through, the strategy that looks so restrictive when 
viewed in the individual case and from the individual point in time. In 
this respect, perfect competition is not only impossible but inferior, and 
has no title to being set up as a model of ideal efficiency. 
Of course, economists have long argued that natural monopoly characterizes some 
industries, as exemplified by electric utilities. Relative to the size of the market to be 
served, the fixed costs of setting up an enterprise in an industry are so high that it is 
uneconomical to have more than one firm serving a particular market area. But, if that is 
the case, then the comparison of output and price under natural monopoly with the 
‘optimal’ levels of product price and product output under competitive conditions is 
irrelevant. If one opts for the ‘natural monopoly’ explanation for the concentrated 
structure of an industry, one cannot then logically invoke the ‘perfect competition’ 
comparison to demonstrate the inefficiency of monopoly. Recognizing the irrelevance 
of the competitive alternative under certain technological and market conditions, 
governments have long regulated utilities by (in principle at least) setting output prices 
that can balance the demands of consumers for reliable and affordable products with the 
financial requirements of utility companies for developing and utilizing the productive 
resources that will enable the delivery of such products to consumers. The analysis of 
the conditions for realizing such long-term projections concerning the evolving relation 
of supply of and demand for such products requires, a theory of the innovating firm that 
can transform technological and market conditions, not a theory of the optimizing firm 
that takes these conditions as given constraints. 
To draw conclusions concerning the relative economic performance of the optimizing 
firm of neoclassical theory, its output and price should be compared with those that can 
be achieved by an innovating firm that transforms technological and/or market 
conditions (see Figure 1). To do so, the theory of innovative enterprise must permit an 
analysis of the determinants of total fixed costs and the relation between average fixed 
costs and average variable costs during the innovation process. The task for a theory of 
                                                                                                                                               
In particular they could not afford to spend as much on improving methods of production and the 
machinery used in it, as a single large firm which knew that it was certain itself to reap the whole 
benefit of any advance it made. This argument does indeed assume the single firm to be managed with 
ability and enterprise, and to have an unlimited command of capital – an assumption which cannot 
always be fairly made. But where it can be made, we may generally conclude that the supply schedule 
for the commodity, if not monopolized, would show higher supply prices than those of our monopoly 
supply schedule; and therefore the equilibrium amount of the commodity produced under free 
competition would be less than that for which the demand price is equal to the monopoly supply 
price’. Marshall (1981: 485n) added in a footnote: ‘Something has already been said ([Book] IV, 
[Chapters] XI, XII; and [Book] V, [Chapters] XI), as to the advantages which a single powerful firm 
has over its smaller rivals in those industries in which the law of increasing return acts strongly; and as 
to the chance which it might have of obtaining a practical monopoly of its own branch of production, 
if it were managed for many generations together by people whose genius, enterprise and energy 
equalled those of the original founders of the business’.   23
innovative enterprise is to explain how, by generating output of a higher quality and/or 
lower cost, a particular enterprise can differentiate itself from its competitors and 
emerge as dominant in its industry.  
Unlike the optimizing firm, the innovating firm does not take as given the fixed costs of 
participating in an industry. Rather, given prevailing factor prices, the level of fixed 
costs that it incurs reflects its innovative strategy. Indivisible technology or the 
‘entrepreneur’ as a fixed factor (typical assumptions, as we have seen, in the 
neoclassical theory of the optimizing firm) does not dictate this ‘fixed-cost’ strategy. 
Rather, the fixed-cost strategy results from the assessment by the firm’s strategic 
decision-makers of the quality and quantity of productive resources in which the firm 
must invest to develop higher quality processes and products than those previously 
available or that will be developed by competitors. It is this development of productive 
resources internal to the enterprise that creates the potential  for an enterprise that 
pursues an innovative strategy to gain a sustained advantage over its competitors and 
emerge as dominant in its industry.  
Such development of productive resources, when successful, becomes embodied in 
products, processes, and people with superior productive capabilities than those that had 
previously existed. But the high fixed costs that such investments entail mean that in 
and of themselves these investments place the firm at a competitive disadvantage until 
such time that, through these investments, it can transform the technologies and access 
the markets that can generate returns. An innovative strategy that can eventually enable 
the firm to develop superior productive capabilities may place that firm at a cost 
disadvantage because such strategies tend to entail higher fixed costs than the fixed 
costs incurred by rivals that choose to optimize subject to given constraints. 
For a given level of factor prices, these higher fixed costs derive from the size and 
duration of the innovative investment strategy. Innovative strategies will entail higher 
fixed costs than those incurred by the optimizing firm if the innovation process requires 
the  simultaneous development of productive resources across a broader and deeper 
range of integrated activities than those undertaken by the optimizing firm. But in 
addition to, and generally independent of, the size of the innovative investment strategy 
at a point in time, high fixed costs will be incurred because of the duration of time that 
is required to develop productive resources until they result in products that are 
sufficiently high quality and low cost to generate returns. If the size of investments in 
physical capital tends to increase the fixed costs of an innovative strategy, so too does 
the duration of the investment in an organization of people who can engage in the 
collective and cumulative – or organizational – learning that is the central characteristic 
of the innovation process. 
The high fixed costs of an innovative strategy create the need for the firm to attain a 
high level of utilization of the productive resources that it has developed. As in the 
neoclassical theory of the optimizing firm, given the productive capabilities that it has 
developed, the innovating firm may experience increasing costs because of the problem 
of maintaining the productivity of variable inputs as it employs larger quantities of these 
inputs in the production process. But rather than, as in the case of the optimizing firm, 
take increasing costs as a given constraint, the innovating firm will attempt to transform 
its access to high-quality productive resources at high levels of output. To do so, it 
invests in the development of that productive resource, the utilization of which as a 
variable input has become a source of increasing costs (see Figure 2).   24
The development of the productive resource adds to the fixed costs of the innovative 
strategy, whereas previously this productive resource was utilized as a variable factor 
that could be purchased incrementally at the going factor price on the market as extra 
units of the input were needed to expand output. Having added to its fixed costs in order 
to overcome the constraint on enterprise expansion posed by increasing variable costs, 
the innovating firm is then under even more pressure to expand its share of the market 
in order to transform high fixed costs into low unit costs. As, through the development 
and utilization of productive resources, the innovating firm succeeds in this 
transformation, it in effect ‘unbends’ the U-shaped cost curve that the optimizing firm 
takes as given (see Figure 2).16 By shaping the cost curve in this way, the innovating 
firm creates the possibility of securing competitive advantage over its rivals. 
As indicated in Figures 4a and 4b, the dynamics of the innovation process depend on the 
evolution of not only product costs but also product demand. Indeed, the two are 
interdependent because the attainment of low unit costs depends on the extent of the 
market that the firm accesses, and the extent of the market that the firm is able to access 
depends on the productive capabilities that its develops. At a point in time there exists a 
potential demand for a good or service that is dependent on both the incomes and wants 
of buyers. The innovative firm, however, must access these markets, a process that 
generally entails investments of considerable size and duration in sales forces, 
distribution and servicing facilities, advertising, and branding. These investments, 
which add to the fixed costs of the innovative investment strategy, are necessary 
because of the need to inform and convince potential buyers that the product is in fact 
(given their wants) ‘higher quality’ than alternative goods or services that could satisfy 
those wants. These investments in accessing markets can shape the demand curve for 
the firm’s product by increasing the quantity of the product that buyers will demand at a 
given price. To some extent and degree, this demand will become ‘dedicated’ as buyers 
come to view the firm’s product as higher quality relative to those of competitors; that 
is, buyers will be willing to pay a premium for the firm’s brand. Market investments can 
also shape the price elasticity of demand for the firm’s product, as the buyers’ 
perception of its higher quality makes them less willing than they would have otherwise 
been to reduce the quantity demanded with an increase in price.17 
The dynamics of the innovation process can enable the innovating firm to capture 
progressively a number of market segments based on different income levels of buyers 
(see  Figures  4a and  4b).  Especially at the initial stages of the innovation process,  the 
                                                 
16    For a fuller theoretical elaboration of this process of sustained innovative transformation, see 
Lazonick 1991a: ch. 3; and 1993.  
17  The notion that a firm can allocate resources to seek to influence market demand for its product was 
the key insight of Edward Chamberlin in his 1933 book, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition. But 
Chamberlin did not seek to construct a theory of the innovating firm. He simply argued that through 
advertising expenditures, the firm could shift outward the demand curve that it faces, thus permitting 
it to charge higher prices. To do so, however, the firm’s cost curve shifts upward so that the firm does 
not increase supply. As Chamberlin (1956, 68) argued, ‘the price is inevitably higher and the sale of 
production inevitably smaller under monopolistic competition than pure competition’. See Lazonick 
1991a, 165-8 for a critique of Chamberlin’s model.   25
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Figure 4b: Accessing markets: process innovation 
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innovating firm may not have sufficiently developed its capabilities to gain access to all 
of these market segments simultaneously. Cumulatively, however, the ability of the 
innovating firm to access one market segment may provide a foundation on which it can 
develop capabilities to access other market segments. 
As a general rule, product innovation will proceed from the higher income segments to 
the lower income segments (see Figure 4a), while process innovation will proceed in the 
other direction (see Figure 4b). By meeting demand for a new product in the high-
income market in the early stage of the innovation process, the firm generates revenues 
that help sustain the process while, through the iterative investment process that I 
described earlier, learns how to mass produce and mass market, thus gaining access to 
buyers who are lower income and, hence, more price sensitive. Innovation in consumer   26
electronics provides a number of examples from calculators in the 1970s to plasma 
television screens in the 2000s of the progression from higher income to lower income 
segments, and from product innovation to process innovation. Alternatively, an 
innovating firm may seek to capture existing mass markets through process innovation 
that, if it can attain a sufficient extent of the market, makes existing products lower cost. 
In this case, as illustrated in Figure 4b, the innovative strategy will target lower income 
markets in the first phase. In subsequent phases, however, the innovating firm will seek 
to move into higher income segments of the market that can afford higher quality 
products by adding new product features to the advantages it has already gained through 
process innovation. Japanese entry and growth in automobiles from the 1950s (first in 
the Japanese markets and then from the 1970s in global markets) provides an excellent 
example of this progression. 
The innovating firm generates revenues when, as a result of developing and utilizing 
productive resources, it can offer buyers a product of a quality that they want at a price 
that they are willing to pay. What then determines output and price in a theory of 
innovative enterprise? The answers are not straightforward because the innovating 
firm’s pricing strategy and its investments designed to shape market demand are 
endogenous to the innovation process itself (see Spence 1981). The innovating firm will 
have a strong interest in increasing the extent of the market to which it has access. 
Greater market share increases the learning experience of the innovating firms, while it 
helps to prevent rivals from gaining access to buyers not only at present but also in the 
future as buyers become customers who repeat their purchases of, and upgrade their 
demand for, the innovating firm’s products (see Christensen 1997).  
The revenues (and not just the profits) that the innovating firm generates can be critical 
to maintaining its organization intact. When the innovating firm generates revenues, it 
has financial resources that can be allocated in a number of ways. If the gains from 
innovation are sufficient, the firm’s revenues create the possibility for self-financing. 
The firm may leverage this financing with bonded and bank debt, depending on its 
relations with the financial sector and its need for finance. For the innovating firm, 
financial resources not only fund new investment but also enable the firm to keep its 
‘learning’ organization intact. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 5, the gains from 
innovation create the possibility of enhancing the remuneration of existing employees to 
motivate superior performance. Once the process is completed, it may be that, as a 
result of these internal rewards, the firm’s wage bill is higher than those dictated by 
labor markets. In fact, however, the gains that it has shared with its employees may have 
been critical inducements to gain their cooperation in implementing its innovative 
investment strategy. What the labor market might view as the firm’s high wages are, in 
dynamic perspective, both sources and outcomes of its competitive advantage. 
In contrast, therefore, to the neoclassical monopoly model that posits that an optimizing 
monopolist will choose to produce at a smaller volume of output and at higher prices 
than the aggregate of optimizing competitive firms in a particular industry, the 
innovating firm becomes dominant by transforming the industry cost structure, shaping 
market demand, and producing at a larger volume of output that it can sell at lower 
prices than the optimizing firms in the industry. By confronting and changing 
technological and market conditions rather than accepting them as constraints on its 
activities, the innovating firm, that is, can outperform the ‘optimizing’ firm in terms of 
both output and cost.   27
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Unlike the optimizing firm, the innovating firm has an interest in lowering prices as part 
of a strategy to increase the extent of the market available to it, which in turn lowers 
unit costs further as the enterprise reaps economies of scale. The economies of scale are 
not given to the industry but reflect the innovating firm’s ability to transform the high-
fixed costs of its innovative investment strategy – a strategy that if economies of scale 
are not attained places the firm at a competitive disadvantage relative to the optimizing 
firm – into the low unit costs that give it competitive advantage. Yet when the 
innovative strategy is successful, the innovating firm has the potential of not only 
outperforming the optimizing firm in terms of product quantity and price but also 
generating sufficient surplus revenues to pay higher wages to employees and higher 
returns to other stakeholders such as suppliers, stockholders, and, through taxation, 
governments. The innovation process, that is, can potentially overcome the 
‘constrained-optimization’ trade-offs between consumption and production in the 
allocation of resources as well as between capital and labor, and even between 
enterprise and society, in the allocation of returns. It is for this reason that innovation 
forms the foundation of economic development. 
Social conditions of innovative enterprise 
As discussed at the end of the last section of this paper, empirical research into the 
characteristics of the innovation process reveals that it is uncertain,  collective, and 
cumulative (O’Sullivan 2000b). The outcome of the process cannot be predicted when 
investments are made, and the transformation of investments into innovation cannot be 
done by one person alone and cannot be done all at once (Penrose 1959; Best 1990: 
125). A strategy to overcome uncertainty requires a collective and cumulative learning 
process. In the theory of innovative enterprise, the role of strategy is to confront 
uncertainty, the role of organization is to generate collective learning, and the role of 
finance is to sustain cumulative learning. Innovation is, therefore, a social process,   28
supported in certain times and places by what can be called ‘social conditions of 
innovative enterprise’. 
The theory of innovative enterprise permits us to identify three social conditions that 
can transform strategy, organization, and finance into innovation, and thus support the 
process of economic development. The social conditions of innovative enterprise 
manifest themselves in social relations that are central to the development of the 
economy. In the remainder of this section of the paper, I will define these social 
conditions, and in the next section I will show how they differ across nations 
characterized by distinctive economic institutions for governing the allocation of 
resources, employing labor, and financing investment. 
The social condition that can transform strategy into innovation is strategic control: a 
set of relations that gives decision-makers the power to allocate the firm’s resources to 
confront the technological, market, and competitive uncertainties that are inherent in the 
innovation process. For innovation to occur, those who occupy strategic decision-
making positions must have both the abilities and incentives to allocate resources to 
innovative investment strategies. Their abilities to do so will depend on their knowledge 
of how the current innovative capabilities of the organization over which they exercise 
allocative control can be enhanced by strategic investments in new, typically 
complementary, capabilities. Their incentives to do so will depend on the alignment of 
their personal interests with the interests of the business organization in attaining and 
sustaining its competitive advantage. 
The social condition that can transform organization into innovation is organizational 
integration: a set of relations that creates incentives for people to apply their skills and 
efforts to organizational objectives. The need for organizational integration derives from 
the developmental complexity of the innovation process – that is, the need for 
organizational learning – combined with the imperative to secure high levels of 
utilization of innovative investments if the high fixed costs of these developmental 
investments are to be transformed into low unit costs. Modes of compensation (in the 
forms of promotion, remuneration, and benefits) are important instruments for 
integrating individuals into the organization. To generate innovation, a mode of 
compensation cannot simply manage the labor market by attracting and retaining 
employees. It must be part of a reward system that manages the learning processes that 
are the essence of innovation; the compensation system must motivate employees as 
individuals to engage in collective learning. This collective learning, moreover, 
cumulates over time, thus necessitating financial commitment to keep the learning 
organization intact. 
The social condition that can transform finance into innovation is financial commitment: 
a set of relations that ensures the allocation of funds to sustain the cumulative 
innovation process until it generates financial returns. What is often called ‘patient’ 
capital enables the capabilities that derive from collective learning to cumulate over 
time, notwithstanding the inherent uncertainty that the innovation process entails. 
Strategic control over internal revenues is a critical form of financial commitment, but 
such ‘inside capital’ must often be supplemented by external sources of finance such as 
stock issues, bond issues, or bank debt that, in different times and places, may be more 
or less committed to sustaining the innovation process.   29
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The social conditions of innovative enterprise perspective asks how and under what 
conditions the exercise of strategic control ensures that the enterprise seeks to grow 
using the collective processes and along the cumulative paths that are the foundations of 
its distinctive competitive success. The perspective emphasizes the role of human 
agency in determining whether and how the enterprise accumulates innovative 
capability, and thus adds an explicitly social dimension to an understanding of ‘dynamic 
capabilities’ that stresses the interaction of asset positions, organizational processes, and 
evolutionary paths in the innovative enterprise (see Teece 2003). Specifically, strategic 
control determines how strategic decision makers choose to build on ‘asset positions’; 
organizational integration determines the structure of incentives that characterize 
‘organizational processes’ that can transform individual actions and individual 
capabilities (including those of strategic managers) into collective learning; and 
financial commitment determines whether the enterprise will have the resources 
available to it to persist along an ‘evolutionary path’ to the point where its accumulation 
of innovative capability can generate financial returns.18  
Of central importance to the accumulation and transformation of capabilities in 
knowledge-intensive industries is the skill base in which the firm invests in pursuing its 
innovative strategy (see Figure 6). Within the firm, the division of labor consists of 
different functional specialties and hierarchical responsibilities. At any point in time a 
firm’s functional and hierarchical division of labor defines its skill base. In the effort to 
generate collective and cumulative learning, those who exercise strategic control can 
choose how to structure the skill base, including how employees move around and up 
the enterprise’s functional and hierarchical division of labor over the course of their 
careers. At the same time, however, the organization of the skill base will be 
                                                 
18  For applications, see Carpenter et al 2003; Lazonick and Prencipe 2005.   30
constrained by both the particular learning requirements of the industrial activities in 
which the firm has chosen to compete and the alternative employment opportunities of 
the personnel whom the firm wants to employ. The innovative enterprise requires that 
those who exercise strategic control be able to recognize the competitive strengths and 
weaknesses of their firm’s existing skill base and, hence, the changes in that skill base 
that will be necessary for an innovative response to competitive challenges. These 
strategic decision-makers must also be able to mobilize committed finance to sustain 
investment in the skill base until it can generate higher quality, lower cost products than 
were previously available  
In cross-national comparative perspective, as will be shown in the next section of this 
paper, the skill base that enterprises employ to transform technologies and access 
markets can vary markedly even in the same industrial activity during the same 
historical era, with different innovative outcomes. Precisely because innovative 
enterprise depends on social conditions, the development and utilization of skill bases 
that occur in one institutional environment may not, at a point in time at least, prevail  
in another institutional environment. Moreover, even within the same industry and   
same nation, dynamic capabilities that yielded innovative outcomes in one historical era 
may become static capabilities that inhibit innovative responses in a subsequent 
historical era. 
4  Economic institutions and innovative enterprise 
If one accepts that business enterprises are social structures that are in turn embedded in 
larger (typically national) institutional environments, a theory of innovative enterprise 
must itself be embedded in a model of the relations among industrial sectors, business 
enterprises, and economic institutions that can support the processes that can transform 
technologies and access markets to generate products that are higher quality and/or 
lower cost than those that had previously existed. Figure 7 provides a schematic 
perspective of the interactions among sectors, enterprises and institutions in shaping the 
social conditions of innovative enterprise. First, I shall explain the interactions depicted 
in this diagram, and then I shall turn to a summary of the variation in social conditions 
of innovative enterprise across the largest developed nations in the last decades of the 
twentieth century. 
Innovation differs across industrial sectors in terms of the technologies that are 
developed and the markets that are accessed. In the theory of the optimizing firm, 
business enterprises take technologies and markets as given: they constrain the 
‘strategy’ of the business enterprise to be like that of each and every other firm in the 
industry. In the theory of the innovating firm, in contrast, enterprise strategy transforms 
technology and markets. In doing so, strategy confronts technological uncertainty – the 
possibility that an innovative investment strategy will fail to develop higher quality 
products or processes – and market uncertainty – the possibility that the strategy will 
fail to access a large enough extent of the market to transform the high fixed costs of 
developing these products and processes into low unit costs. But, as indicated in lower 
part of Figure 7, the innovating firm must also confront competitive uncertainty – the 
possibility that even if the firm is successful in transforming technology and accessing 
markets to develop higher quality, lower cost products than were previously available, 
competitors will do it better and cheaper.   31
Figure 7. Social conditions of innovative enterprise 






















The rise of new competition poses a challenge to the innovating firm. It can seek to 
make an innovative response or, alternatively, it can seek to adapt on the basis of the 
investments that it has already made by, for example, obtaining wage and work 
concessions from employees, debt relief from creditors, or tax breaks or other subsidies 
from the state (see Lazonick 1993). An enterprise that chooses the adaptive response in 
effect shifts from being an innovating to an optimizing firm. How the enterprise 
responds (as depicted in Figure 7) will depend on not only the abilities and incentives of 
those who exercise strategic control but also the skills and efforts that can be integrated 
in its organization and the committed finance that, in the face of competitive challenges, 
can be mobilized to sustain the innovation process. 
If and when innovation is successful in a particular nation over a sustained period of 
time, the types of strategic control, organizational integration, and financial 
commitment that characterize the nation’s innovating firms will constitute distinctive 
social conditions of innovative enterprise. Why, one might ask, would the social 
conditions of innovative enterprise exhibit similar characteristics across firms in a 
nation, particularly when they are engaged in different industries? Or, to put the 
question differently, why would not the social conditions of innovative enterprise be the 
same for all firms in all industries across all nations? The answer to both questions, as 
depicted in Figure 7, is that historically nations differ in their institutions. At any point 
in time these institutions both enable and proscribe the activities of firms, while over 
time distinctive elements of these institutions become embedded in the ways in which 
firms function. Of particular importance in influencing the social conditions of 
innovative enterprise are economic institutions related to governance, employment, and 
investment. Through a historical process, the strategic, organizational, and financial 
activities of a nation’s innovative enterprises shape the characteristics of these economic 
institutions, but these institutions also exist and persist independently of these 
enterprises as part of the ‘social fabric’ – the rules and norms of the nation applicable to 
economic activity that find application in the social relations of that nation’s firms.   32
Governance institutions determine how a society assigns rights and responsibilities to 
different groups of people over the allocation of its productive resources and how it 
imposes restrictions on the development and utilization of these resources. Employment 
institutions determine how a society develops the capabilities of its present and future 
labor forces as well as the level of employment and the conditions of work and 
remuneration. Investment institutions determine the ways in which a society ensures 
that sufficient financial resources will be available on a continuing basis to sustain the 
development of its productive capabilities. These economic institutions both enable and 
proscribe the strategic, organizational, and financial activities of business enterprises, 
thus influencing the conditions of innovative enterprise that characterize social relations 
within any given firm at any point in time. As these business enterprises succeed at 
innovation, they may reshape the conditions of innovative enterprise; for example, their 
strategic decision-makers, acting collectively, may take steps to reform these institutions 
to suit the new needs of their enterprises. 
This highly schematic perspective, therefore, posits a dynamic historical relation 
between organizations and institutions in the evolution of the social conditions of 
innovative enterprise. To go beyond this schema requires the integration of the theory of 
innovative enterprise with comparative research on the evolution of the conditions of 
innovative enterprise in different times and places. To study the innovative enterprise in 
abstraction from the particular social conditions that enable it to generate higher quality, 
lower costs products is to forego an understanding of why a firm became innovative in 
the first place and how its innovative capabilities may be rendered obsolete. A 
comparative-historical analysis enables us to learn from the past and provides working 
hypotheses for ongoing research (for an explication of this integrative methodology, see 
Lazonick 2002b; for a comparative-historical synthesis of the innovative firm, see 
Lazonick 2004c). 
For a first example of such a working hypothesis, the comparative-historical experience 
of innovative enterprise suggests that, contrary to a common belief that has persisted 
since the late nineteenth century, the form of firm ownership is not the critical issue for 
understanding the type of strategic control that supports innovative enterprise. Critical 
are the abilities and incentives of those managers who exercise strategic control. 
Whether they are majority owners of the firm, state employees, or employees of 
publicly listed companies, one needs to know where and how these strategic managers 
gained the experience to allocate resources to the innovation process, and the conditions 
under which their personal rewards have depended on the firm’s innovative success. 
Second, the most fundamental, if by no means the only, source of financial commitment 
for the innovating firm is to be found in those revenues that are generated by the firm 
itself. Retentions form the foundation of corporate finance (Myers and Majluf 1984; 
Corbett and Jenkinson 1997; O’Sullivan 2003a). The use of bank finance to leverage 
internal funds in providing financial commitment requires close relations between 
financial institutions and innovating firms, as for example in the Japanese model. In 
certain times and places, the stock market can provide some well-positioned firms with 
financial commitment. But as an investment institution, the major role of the stock 
market is to provide liquidity to productive investments that have already made, not 
commitment to finance new productive investments. It enables owner-entrepreneurs and 
venture capitalists to cash out of their investments in startup companies, and it enables 
households to diversify their savings portfolios so that they can (hopefully) tap into the 
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monitoring the innovative capabilities of the companies that have listed their equities on 
it. 
Third, while strategic control and financial commitment are essential to innovative 
enterprise, it is organizational integration that determines the innovative capability that a 
firm actually possesses. The types of organizational integration that result in innovation 
vary across industries and institutional environments as well as over time. The 
hierarchical and functional divisions of labor that, when integrated into learning 
processes, have generated innovation in the past cannot necessarily be expected to do so 
in the future when faced with changes in technology, markets, and competition – 
changes that to some extent successful innovation in itself brings about. 
In a theory of innovative enterprise, strategy, finance, and organization are interlinked 
in a dynamic process with learning as an outcome. To fully comprehend innovative 
enterprise, there is a need to understand the actual learning processes: the relation 
between tacit knowledge and codified knowledge, between individual capabilities and 
collective capabilities, and between what is learned at a point in time and how that 
learning cumulates over time (see Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000b). The prevailing 
social conditions of innovative enterprise provide the context for those learning 
processes, shaping the types of learning that are attempted, the extent to which these 
processes are sustained, and the ways in which people interact both cognitively and 
behaviorally in the learning process. The influence of the social context is manifested by 
the functional and hierarchical integration of skill bases that can vary dramatically 
across industries and institutional environments as well as over time (Lazonick 2004c). 
The US Old Economy model19 
We can begin a comparative analysis of these different social conditions of innovative 
enterprise by taking as our ‘benchmark’ case the US Old Economy business model, the 
dominant business model in global competition of the post-Second World War decades 
(see Figure 8). A basic characteristic of this business model was the separation of share 
ownership and managerial control. The existence of well-developed stock markets, most 
notably the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), had during the first decades of the 
century resulted in the fragmentation of shareholding, leaving career managers in 
control of the allocation of corporate resources. In principle, boards of directors 
representing the interests of shareholders monitored the decisions of these managers; in 
practice, incumbent top executives chose the outside directors and were themselves 
members of the board. Shareholders could challenge management through proposals to 
the annual general meeting, but over the course of the twentieth century a body of law 
evolved that enabled management to exclude stockholder proposals that dealt with 
                                                 
19   There are extensive literatures on a wide range of topics that inform the characterizations of the 
various national business models presented below. Except where quoting directly or using specific 
data rather than reference each particular argument throughout the text, for each business model I 
provide the reader with a list of the core references on which I have drawn (including previous papers 
of mine that in turn contain the relevant bibliographic references). For the US Old Economy business 
model these references include Noble 1977; Mowery and Rosenberg 1989; Chandler 1990: Hughes 
1990; Lazonick 1990: chs 7-10; 2002a; 2004a; Brody 1993; Rosenberg and Nelson 1994; Hounshell 
1996; and O’Sullivan 2000a: chs 3-6; and 2003a.   34
normal business matters (for example, acquisitions or downsizings) as distinct from 
social issues (for example, sex discrimination or corporate pollution). 
What motivated top managers to act in the interests of the organizations rather than 
themselves were general norms of business behavior that derived from the fact that, 
having spent their careers with the companies that they came to head, top executives 
saw themselves as ‘organization men’. Their own career success depended on the 
success of the enterprise as a whole. In the immediate post-Second World War decades 
the salaries of top executives of US corporations remained constrained by the 
hierarchical salary structures of the managerial organizations over which they presided. 
Already in the 1950s, however, top executives of these companies were receiving stock 
options, a mode of compensation that, as I shall elaborate below, was ultimately 
destructive of the organizational integration of those in positions of strategic control. 
The Old Economy US business model worked effectively to generate innovation when 
executives who exercised strategic control were integrated with an organization of 
administrative and technical specialists who engaged in the development and ensured 
the utilization of the company’s productive resources. These ‘organization men’ were 
on career paths along which they moved up and around a particular corporate hierarchy, 
with the possibility, even if not the high probability, of themselves rising to top 
executive positions. These cohesive managerial structures encouraged the functional 
integration of the capabilities of administrative and technical specialists, contributing to 
the world’s most formidable systems of mass production. 
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At the same time, however, a distinctive feature of the US Old Economy model was the 
organizational segmentation between, in the upper part of the hierarchy, salaried 
managers, in whose training and experience the corporation made heavy investments, 
and, in the lower part of the hierarchy, so-called ‘hourly’ workers who, while they often 
spent their entire working lives with one company, were considered to be 
interchangeable commodities in whose capabilities the company had no need to 
invest.20 Salaried managers entered these corporations with higher education degrees 
from a well-funded, government-supported system whose curricula had historically 
been shaped by the needs of business corporations for technical and administrative 
personnel. Hourly workers entered these corporations with high school diplomas that 
generally reflected mediocre educations.  
Nevertheless, union representation, seniority hiring and firing, overtime pay, the need of 
corporations for reliable even if low-skilled workers to tend mass production processes, 
and the success of the Old Economy model combined to enable these hourly workers to 
receive good pay and benefits. As a rule, however, the hourly worker could over the 
course of his or her working life at best hope to rise to the rank of foreman, a salaried 
position that (as was the case for all salaried employees) denied these supervisors the 
right to be represented in collective bargaining but was generally dead-end in terms of 
any further career mobility up the managerial hierarchy. Meanwhile a central 
preoccupation of salaried managers in the post-Second World War decades was to 
develop skill-displacing automated technologies so that in ‘the factory of the future’ 
their companies could dispense with the employment of hourly workers whom they 
viewed as being undereducated, underskilled, and overpaid.  
The US Old Economy corporation received considerable financial support from 
government programs for technology development in areas such as aerospace, 
computers, and biotechnology. The development of the productive potential of these 
government investments relied on corporate research capabilities, but, given the size 
and duration of the investments involved, even the largest and most successful business 
corporations would not have been able or willing to finance them on their own. 
Retained earnings formed the financial foundation for the investments that the 
corporations did make; in the 1960s and 1970s corporate taxes were about 39 percent of 
corporate profits (including inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments), 
dividends were about 25 percent, and retentions about 36 percent. When corporations 
needed additional investment financing, they issued corporate bonds at favorable rates 
that reflected conservative debt-equity ratios. Bank loans were used almost exclusively 
for working capital. Companies made only limited use of the stock market as a source of 
investment funds. 
As I discuss below, during the 1970s and 1980s, the US Old Economy model began to 
falter in the face of Japanese competition that integrated shop-floor workers into the 
processes of organizational learning. In addition, the internal cohesion of the managerial 
organizations of US corporations weakened, particularly as corporations grew bigger 
and diversified into many different lines of business. The conglomerate movement of 
                                                 
20  Non-salaried  employees  were  classified as ‘hourly’ (or ‘non-exempt’) workers because of the 
stipulation of the National Labor Relations Act that emerged from the New Deal era that required 
employees who were paid an hourly wage 150 percent of that wage if they worked longer than the 
normal working hours. The overtime work of salaried personnel is exempt from this provision.   36
the 1960s segmented top executives from the rest of the managerial organization. 
Increasingly, moreover, an integrative hierarchical reward structure ceased to regulate 
the pay of top executives, who embraced wholeheartedly the ideology of maximizing 
shareholder value as their boards bestowed on them ever more generous stock option 
awards. At the same time, in the high-tech industries, younger professional, technical, 
and administrative personnel became much less dependent on the pursuit of careers 
within Old Economy hierarchies as the creation of new firms based on a ‘New 
Economy’ business model provided them the possibility of using interfirm mobility to 
pursue alternative career paths. 
The British model21 
While the power of US Old Economy business model declined during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, it occupied a position of global dominance in the post-
Second World War decades. The innovative power of the US Old Economy model was 
particularly evident when placed in competition with the much more hierarchically and 
functionally segmented business model that prevailed in Britain. Coming into the 
twentieth century, Britain had been the world leader in GDP per capita before it was 
surpassed by the United States. In 1932-1935, with the US mired in the Great 
Depression, Britain once again emerged briefly with the world’s highest GDP per 
capita, and then (among the large economies) remained second to the US until the 
beginning of the 1970s when it was overtaken first by France and then Western 
Germany and Japan. From the late 1960s to the present Britain’s GDP per capita has 
been about 70 percent of that of the United States (Maddison 2004).  
As an industrial nation that been the ‘workshop of the world’ in an era of proprietary 
capitalism, Britain was slow to make the transition to managerial capitalism. Although 
coming into the post-Second World War period, Britain had a presence in all of the 
major consumer and capital goods industries, ranging from steel to cars and from 
machine tools to electronics, its companies generally failed to remain competitive in 
global markets. As depicted in Figure 8, a prime reason was the organizational 
segmentation that characterized the British business model. Top executives of major 
British companies tended to be segmented from the rest of the organization, and 
technical specialists tended to be functionally segmented from one another.  
The hierarchical segmentation of top executives hampered their ability to invest in 
organizational capabilities in response to innovative challenges. The historical origins of 
this segmentation can be found in the interaction between the control of British 
industrial enterprises and the structure of British society during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Families remained in the control of British firms, and yet, as leading 
industrialists, they did not constitute an elite social class that could reshape Britain’s 
economic institutions to support the new requirements of innovation enterprise. British 
industrialists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were generally middle 
class, with their home bases in the industrial districts of the Midlands and the North. 
Large accumulations of wealth in Britain were in the hands not of these industrialists 
                                                 
21  This section draws on Hannah 1983; Elbaum and Lazonick 1986; Sorge and Warner 1986; Lazonick 
1986; 1990: ch. 6; Daunton 1992; Chandler 1990; Walker 1993; Dore et al. 1999; Owen 1999; Coates 
2002, Vol. III, Part II; Cheffins 2004; Francks et al. 2004.   37
but of financiers based in the City of London. Using upper-class educational institutions 
as means of entry and marriages as instruments of merger, wealthy financiers joined 
with the old landowning elite (many of them grown recently wealthy through rising land 
values) to form a new aristocracy. The wealth of this restructured upper class was not, 
as was increasingly the case in the United States and Germany, based on the application 
of science to industry and the resultant profits from technological innovation. Rather, 
the bases of wealth in financial activities were social connections and acquired 
reputations. Hence the importance for ultimate economic success of family connections 
and associations made at elite educational institutions – the ancient universities of 
Oxford and Cambridge as well as public schools such as Eton and Harrow. 
Lacking industrial roots, the aristocracy who controlled these elite institutions during 
the era of the second industrial revolution had no need for an educational system that 
developed technologists. They valued the study of science as a branch of sophisticated 
knowledge but had no interest in its application to industry. Indeed they positively 
resisted the notion that a concern with technology had any place in an elite education; 
its function was to set them apart from middle-class industrialists, not to bring them in 
closer contact with them. By the same token, successful industrialists who accumulated 
sufficient fortunes to join Britain’s upper class had little interest in challenging the anti-
technology bias of Britain’s elite educational system. As individuals, they wanted to 
elevate their social standing, not transform British social institutions. As Donald 
Coleman (1973) put it in a well-known essay, successful British industrialists sought to 
become ‘gentlemen’ rather than ‘players’. 
In seeking to move up the social hierarchy, successful industrialists did not abandon 
industry for finance; barriers to entry into finance and related pursuits were high 
precisely because of the centrality of social connections and reputation to the success of 
the financial enterprise. Rather control over an established industrial enterprise 
remained the foundation of their material wealth and the most assured means of passing 
it on to their heirs. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, they handed 
control over their businesses to their sons and sons-in-law, thus perpetuating the relation 
between ownership and control. In many industries, mergers among family firms led to 
a decline of the ownership stake of any single family in many major British companies. 
Now, however, an amalgam of family firms, each with its own minority stake, occupied, 
and in effect divided, positions of strategic control in these companies, as family 
members continued to dominate the boards, including executive director positions. In an 
era in which the ‘managerial revolution’ professionalized positions of strategic control 
in not only in the United States but also Germany and Japan, the managers of major 
British enterprises remained by almost all accounts amateurs. 
The larger owner-controlled firms that had to go beyond family members to recruit 
higher-level managers gave preference to graduates of Oxbridge. A study of the career 
mobility of British industrial managers done in the mid-1950s found that the most 
advantageous educational qualification was an arts degree from Oxford or Cambridge 
(Acton Society Trust 1956, 8, 128). By the 1960s, the emphasis had turned toward 
science degrees from the elite universities. But scientists and engineers from provincial 
universities remained second-class citizens within industrial enterprises, with little if 
any prospect of rising from the specialist to executive level. Given this hierarchical 
segmentation, societies of chemical and electrical engineers set their own qualifications 
for university graduates to enter their professions. In contrast, in the United States 
corporate involvement with the university system itself set the professional standards   38
for these specialists. The result in Britain was a functional segmentation among 
technical specialists that impeded organizational learning within enterprises.  
The problem of functional segmentation extended to the shop floor where craft workers 
jealousy guarded their realms of craft control. In machine-based industries there was 
some hierarchical mobility of craft workers to specialist positions, but this mobility only 
served to reinforce the hierarchical segmentation of craft control from corporate control 
and functional segmentation among technical specialists. These shop-floor workers 
were more highly skilled than their US counterparts, but they used these skills to 
preserve their craft prerogatives embodied in ‘custom and practice’. Meanwhile, given 
the weakness of British managerial organization, those who exercised strategic control 
over British industrial firms made little attempt to develop shop-floor skills as part of an 
innovative investment strategy, as was being done for example in Germany and Japan. 
Recognizing the barriers that craft demarcations posed to raising productivity, during 
the 1960s many companies sought to reorganize their production processes by granting 
wage increases to groups of workers in exchange for the elimination of craft rules. 
Studies of these experiments in ‘productivity bargaining’ found that the result was often 
a proliferation of new craft rules created by groups of workers who would then agree to 
drop these rules in exchange for higher pay. 
This segmented structure of business organization remained in place in Britain during 
the post-Second World War decades. In the 1950s and 1960s a hostile takeover 
movement as well as nationalizations challenged the persistence of family control. As a 
defense against takeover, incumbent managers often increased dividends payments, 
while in the aftermath of a successful takeover, new management often did the same. 
One result was that, notwithstanding the relatively poor performance of British 
industrial companies, their dividend payout ratios were high relative to those in other 
developed nations, including the United States. Indeed, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
relatively high dividend yields induced institutional investors such as pension funds and 
insurance companies to allocate considerable proportions of their portfolios to corporate 
equities. Britain’s financial community, centered in the City of London, remained much 
more concerned with reaping the returns from the investments that British business 
corporations had made in the past than with providing these companies with financial 
commitment for innovative investment strategies that could generate new sources of 
returns in the future.  
Government monetary policies during the Thatcher era of the 1980s pushed British 
industry to the wall, and thus helped to resolve its competitive shortcomings by forcing 
many firms organized along the British model to shut down. Subsequently Japanese and 
Korean companies revived the British industrial base by setting up plants in Britain to 
serve as platforms for exports to European markets. Run according to distinctive 
business models imported from their own countries, these foreign direct investments 
have enjoyed considerable success, in the process helping to bring modern management 
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The Japanese model22 
In the 1970s and 1980s the Japanese business model directly confronted the US Old 
Economy model, as depicted in Figure 9. In the post-Second World War decades, US 
managerial corporations dominated in international competition in a wide range of high 
technology industries. Many of these corporations had been accumulating innovative 
capabilities from the late nineteenth century. During the depressed years of the 1930s, 
even those US industrial corporations that cut back production and employment 
dramatically nevertheless continued to invest in R&D and enhance their innovative 
capability. Within the new structure of cooperative industrial relations that emerged out 
the conflicts of the depression years, US industrial corporations were able to take 
advantage of the post-Second World War boom to re-establish themselves as the 
world’s pre-eminent producers of consumer durables such as automobiles and electrical 
appliances and related capital goods such as steel and machine tools. With the help of 
US government research support and contracts, US companies also became the leaders 
computer and semiconductor industries. 
Then in the 1970s and 1980s Japanese companies challenged the US industrial 
corporations in the very industrial sectors in which even as late as the 1960s US 
corporations seemed to have held insurmountable competitive advantage. Building on 
the development of innovative capabilities in their home market during the 1950s and 
1960s, Japanese companies gained competitive advantage over US companies in 
industries such as steel, memory chips, machine tools, electrical machinery, consumer 
electronics, and automobiles. Initially, as Japanese exports to the United States 
increased rapidly in the last half of the 1970s, many observers attributed the challenge 
to the lower wages and longer working hours that prevailed in Japan. By the early 
1980s, however, with real wages in Japan continuing to rise, it became clear that 
Japanese advantage was based on superior capabilities for generating higher quality, 
lower cost products. 
Three business institutions – stable shareholding, permanent employment, and main 
bank lending23 – provided the social conditions for Japan’s remarkable success. Stable 
shareholding ensured that the top managers of Japanese industrial corporations would 
possess the strategic control required to make innovative investments in industries in 
which in the 1950s there was no inherent reason to believe that they would ultimately be 
successful in international competition. Permanent employment enabled the companies 
involved to put in place a new model of hierarchical and functional integration that 
enabled them to engage in collective and cumulative learning in ways that their 
international competitors could not. Main bank lending supplied these companies with a 
level of financial commitment that permitted them to both grow rapidly and sustain the 
innovation process until they could generate returns first on home and then on foreign 
product markets. Let us look briefly at how these institutions evolved and became 
                                                 
22   This section draws on Hadley 1970; Yonekawa 1984; Abegglen and Stalk 1985; Cusumano 1985; 
Gordon, 1985; Dore 1986; 1987; 1990; 2000; Clark and Fujimoto 1991; Aoki and Dore, 1994; 
Okimoto and Nishi 1994; Lazonick 1995; 1998; 1999; Sako and Sato 1997; Morikawa 2001; as well 
as many references cited therein. 
23   These institutions are more generally called ‘cross-shareholding’, ‘lifetime employment’, and ‘the 
main bank system’, respectively. For reasons that will be noted in this discussion, and which are 
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embedded in the functioning of the Japanese industrial enterprise in the post-Second 
World War decades. 
In 1948 the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers – the occupation authority in 
Japan – began the dissolution of the zaibatsu, the giant holding companies that had 
dominated the Japanese economy from the Meiji era of the late nineteenth century to the 
Second World War. The dissolution process not only dispossessed the families that 
owned the zaibatsu but also removed from office the top management layers of the 
zaibatsu holding companies and major affiliated companies. Taking over control of 
strategic decision-making in Japan’s industrial enterprises were ‘third-rank executives’, 
primarily engineers who were plucked from the ranks of middle management to take 
leadership positions of companies that had no alternative but to find new uses for their 
accumulated capabilities in non-military markets.  
The control exercised by these young and ambitious executives was by no means 
secure. There was a fear that stockholders, almost 70 percent of whom were individuals, 
might join forces to demand the traditional control rights as owners. To invest in the 
capabilities of their companies, enterprise managers needed to maintain as much control 
as possible over the allocation of corporate revenues. But the undeveloped state of the 
companies subsequent to the dissolution of the zaibatsu and the structure of public 
shareholding left Japanese enterprises vulnerable, if not to takeovers, then to debilitating 
demands from outside interests for the distribution of their earnings if and when such 
earnings should appear. 
To defend themselves against demands for ‘shareholder value’ by these outside 
interests, the community of corporate executives engaged in the practice of cross-
shareholding. Banks and industrial companies took equities off the market by holding 
each other's shares. Increasingly, business relations among companies, be they industrial 
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or financial, became cemented by cross-shareholding arrangements, with a company 
that had closer relations with another company being more likely to hold larger amounts 
of that company’s shares, up to the legal maximum of five percent of shares outstanding 
(or ten percent in the case of holdings by insurance companies). Over time, as business 
relations among financial and industrial enterprises changed, the web of cross-
shareholding became more intricate so that mutual  shareholding between two 
companies ceased to be an important feature of the system; what became important was 
the entire system of stable shareholding. The institution of stable shareholding is not 
based on contractual relations but rather has been sustained by the willingness of the 
entire Japanese business community to accept that one company does not seek its own 
advantage by selling its shareholdings of another company to public shareholders.24  
Japanese companies have routinely given their proxy votes to the managers of the 
companies whose shares they hold. To reduce the possibility for outside shareholders to 
press their demands on management, virtually all companies listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange have held their annual general meetings of shareholders at the same time on 
the same day – the last Friday in June at 2:00pm, with the meetings lasting on average, 
over the course of the 1990s, 28.37 minutes (Hilary and Oshika 2003: 41). Nevertheless, 
until the government cracked down on the practice in the mid-1990s, yakusa, members 
of Japanese organized crime, routinely extorted bribes from Japanese top managers in 
return for promises not to ask embarrassing questions at the shareholders’ meeting, and, 
with the bribe having been paid, to intimidate anyone else in attendance who might be 
thinking of doing so.  
By 1955, according to its broadest, and most relevant, definition as stock in the hands of 
stable shareholders who would not unilaterally sell their shares on the market, stable 
shareholding represented 25 percent of outstanding stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, and by 1960 it had risen to about 40 percent. It declined slightly in the early 
1960s, but after the opening up of Japanese capital markets in 1964, when Japan joined 
OECD, the business community, fearing foreign takeovers, took steps to increase stable 
shareholding. It surpassed 60 percent in 1975, and remained above that figure until 
2000, peaking at 67.4 percent in 1988. During the recessionary years of the 1990s, there 
was a gradual decline of stable shareholdings to 62 percent in 1998 and then a sharp 
drop to 57 percent in 2000. Financial institutions, burdened by mountains of non-
performing loans and compelled to realize the value of their shares to restore capital-
adequacy ratios, accounted for the vast majority of the sell-offs while foreigners 
accounted for almost all of the increase in the proportions of all outstanding shares 
held.25 
From the 1950s corporate managers used the strategic control that stable shareholding 
protected to build organizations characterized by functional and hierarchical integration 
(see Figure 9). Critical to this organization-building, however, were the investments in 
                                                 
24  When in financial distress, a company might raise cash by selling some of its stable shareholdings to 
other companies at the going market price but with an understanding that the shares would be 
repurchased, also at the going market price, if and when its financial condition improved. 
25  In March 2000 foreigners held 13.2 percent of outstanding shares, up from 4.2 percent in 1990 and 
10.0 percent in 1998. By 2004 that share is said to have increased to about 18 percent, but, 
inexplicably, since 2000, the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which beginning in 1949 had annually updated 
the series on shareholdings by type of holder, has not reported these figures.   42
an educated labor force that the Japanese government had made since the last decades of 
the nineteenth century. In the decades after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, the primary 
and secondary education of the entire population was raised to a high level. 
Simultaneously, a transformation of the system of higher education generated a growing 
supply of university graduates who entered industry. In addition to paying them well, 
the companies often incurred the considerable expense of sending these highly educated 
employees abroad for varying lengths of time to acquire industrial experience. 
As a result, in the aftermath of the Second World War, Japanese companies could draw 
on a sizable supply of highly educated and experienced engineers and managers. Many 
Toyota employees, for example, had accumulated relevant technological experience 
over the previous decades working for the enterprise group when it was Japan’s leading 
producer of textile machinery. In addition, the automobile industry was able to attract 
many engineers who had gained experience in Japan’s aircraft industry before and 
during the war. 
Before the war, moreover, many Japanese companies had integrated foremen into the 
structure of managerial learning so that they could not only supervise but also train 
workers on the shop floor. Whereas in the United States, the foreman, as ‘the man in the 
middle’, served as a buffer between the managerial organization and the shop floor, in 
Japan the foreman was an integrator of managerial and shop-floor learning. From the 
late nineteenth century, a prime objective of US managerial learning had been to 
develop machine technologies that could dispense with the skills of craft workers. In 
contrast, with an accumulation of such craft skills lacking in Japan, the problem that had 
confronted technology-oriented managers from the Meiji era had been to develop skills 
on the shop floor as part of a strategy of organizational learning that integrated the 
capabilities of managers and workers. 
The rise of enterprise unions in the early 1950s both reflected and enhanced the social 
foundations for the hierarchical integration of shop-floor workers. During the last half 
of the 1940s, dire economic conditions and democratization initiatives gave rise to a 
militant labor movement of white-collar (technical and administrative) and blue-collar 
(operative) employees. The goal of the new industrial unions was to implement 
‘production control’: the takeover of idle factories so that workers could put them into 
operation and earn a living. As an alternative to these militant industrial unions, leading 
companies created enterprise unions of white-collar and blue-collar employees. In 1950 
under economic conditions rendered more severe by the Occupation’s anti-inflationary 
polices, companies such as Toyota, Toshiba, and Hitachi fired militant workers and 
offered enterprise unionism to the remaining employees. The post-Korean War 
recession of 1953 created another opportunity for more companies to expel the militants 
and introduce enterprise unionism.  
Foremen and supervisors were members of the union, as were all university-educated 
personnel for at least the first ten years of employment before they made the official 
transition into ‘management’. Union officials, who were company employees, held 
regularly scheduled conferences with management at different levels of the enterprise to 
resolve issues concerning remuneration, work conditions, work organization, transfers, 
and production. The continued and rapid expansion of the Japanese economy in the 
high-growth era ensured that enterprise unionism would become an entrenched Japanese 
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The most important achievement of enterprise unionism was ‘lifetime employment’, a 
system of permanent employment that, while not contractually guaranteed, gave white-
collar and blue-collar workers employment security to the retirement age of, first, 55; 
from the 1980s, 60; and from the late 1990s at a growing number of companies, 65. 
This employment security both won the commitment of the workers to the company and 
gave the company the incentive to develop the productive capabilities of its workers. 
The system did not differ in principle from the organizational integration of 
professional, technical, and administrative employees that was at the heart of the US 
managerial revolution, except in one extremely important respect. Unlike the United 
States where there was a sharp segmentation between salaried managers and hourly 
workers, Japanese companies of the post-Second World War decades extended 
permanent employment to both white-collar and blue-collar personnel, thus providing a 
foundation for the hierarchical integration of shop-floor workers into a company-wide 
process of organizational learning.  
Top managers had ultimate control over strategic investments, and technical specialists 
designed products and processes, typically on the basis of foreign technology. But, 
given these managerial capabilities, the unique ability of Japanese companies to 
transform technology acquired from abroad to generate new standards of quality and 
cost depended on not only the abilities of their engineers but also the integration of 
shop-floor workers into organizational learning processes. Through their engagement in 
processes of cost reduction, Japanese shop-floor workers were continuously involved in 
a more general process of improvement of products and processes that, by the 1970s, 
enabled Japanese companies to emerge as world leaders in factory automation – by the 
early 1990s the stock of robots in Japanese factories was about seven times the US 
figure. Also of great importance was the ability of Japanese manufacturers to eliminate 
waste in production; by the late 1970s, for example, Japan’s competitive advantage in 
television sets was not in labor costs or even scale economies but in a savings of 
materials costs. This productive transformation became particularly important in 
international competition in the 1980s as Japanese wages approached the levels of the 
advanced industrial economies of North America and Western Europe and, especially 
from 1985, as the value of the yen dramatically strengthened. During the 1980s and 
1990s, influenced by not only Japan’s export performance but also the impact of 
Japanese direct investment in North America and Western Europe, many Western 
companies sought, with varying degrees of success, to implement Japanese high-quality, 
low-cost mass-production methods. 
During the 1980s, most Western analyses of the sources of Japanese competitive 
advantage focused on the hierarchical integration of the shop-floor worker into the 
organizational learning process. By the early 1990s the emphasis shifted to the role of 
‘cross-functional management’, ‘company-wide quality control’, or ‘concurrent 
engineering’ in generating higher quality, lower cost products. The hierarchical 
integration of engineers with shop-floor workers fostered the functional integration as 
specialized engineers engaged in teams to solve practical manufacturing problems. 
Much of the discussion of functional integration focused on its role in ‘new product 
development’ in international comparative perspective, with the US managerial 
corporation based on the Old Economy business model performing quite poorly in 
competition with the Japanese. The evolution of the semiconductor industry provides a 
vivid example of the competitive power, but also possibly the limits, of Japanese 
organizational integration. From the late 1970s the Japanese mounted a formidable   44
competitive challenge to US producers in dynamic random access memory (DRAM) 
chips, forcing most US companies, including Intel, to withdraw from the market after 
1985. Already a powerhouse in semiconductors before the Japanese challenge, Intel re-
emerged even stronger in the 1990s as the leader in microprocessors, a product in which 
it was the pioneer in the early 1970s and for which during the 1980s it secured the 
franchise for the IBM PC and the subsequent IBM clones. 
Organizational integration was critical to the Japanese challenge in DRAMs. In a 
comparative study of Japanese and US semiconductor manufacturing Daniel Okimoto 
and Nishi (1994, 193) argued that ‘[p]erhaps the most striking feature of Japanese R&D 
in the semiconductor industry is the extraordinary degree of communication and ‘body 
contact’ that takes place at the various juncture and intersection points in the R&D 
processes – from basic research to advanced development, from advanced development 
to new product design, from new product design to new process technology, from new 
process technology to factory-site manufacturing, from manufacturing to marketing, and 
from marketing to servicing’. They contrasted the organization of Japanese 
semiconductor manufacturing with that in the United States, where design engineers had 
the glamour jobs and manufacturing engineers were viewed as ‘second-class citizens’. 
Value added in microprocessors is in product design that determines the use of the 
product. Value added in semiconductors is in process engineering that reduces defects 
and increases chip yields. By the 1980s Japanese companies such as Fujitsu, Hitachi, 
and NEC were able to achieve yields that were 40 percent higher than the best US 
companies. Central to this advantage was the development of advanced semiconductor 
manufacturing technology, itself the result of the organizational integration of engineers 
into manufacturing activities and interactive learning with equipment suppliers. In 1987, 
fearful that it would become totally dependent on the Japanese for semiconductor 
manufacturing equipment, the US Semiconductor Industry Association launched the 
manufacturing technology research consortium, Sematech, with support from the US 
Department of Defense and exemption from the antitrust laws on the grounds that 
national security was at risk. 
More generally, and contrary to conventional wisdom, in terms of support for 
technology development, it was the United States government, not the Japanese 
government, that was the more formidable ‘developmental state’. Indeed, as I shall 
elaborate below, the US New Economy business model, of which a Silicon Valley 
company such as Intel is an exemplar, would never have emerged without massive 
government investments in the post-Second World War decades in the electronics 
industry. In contrast, it was in the realm of finance, not technology, that the Japanese 
state played a developmental role by structuring the banking system as an investment 
institution to fund the high-speed growth of industrial enterprises during the postwar 
decades. While stable shareholding gave corporate managers strategic control over the 
allocation of profits in the post-Second World War decades, even with low payout ratios 
corporate retentions were grossly insufficient to finance the capital requirements of 
Japanese companies in the era of high-speed growth. Using retentions as a foundation, 
most of the financial commitment of Japanese companies came from bank loans, with 
the companies’ debt-equity ratios often at 3:1 and at times higher. In borrowing these 
funds, each major industrial company had a ‘main bank’ whose job it was to convince 
other banks to join it in making loans to the company and to take the lead in 
restructuring its client company should it fall into financial distress.   45
During the 1980s many economists both in Japan and the West who looked to agency 
theory to understand the Japanese firm, incorrectly identified the ‘main bank system’ as 
the central institution of corporate governance (see Aoki and Patrick 1994). They 
contended that the main bank system enabled financial interests as principals – in the 
Japanese case the banks rather than shareholders – to monitor the behavior of managers 
as agents. In funding the growth of Japanese companies, however, the Japanese banks 
were relatively passive agents of government development policy, with ‘overloans’ 
being made by the Bank of Japan to its member banks for providing highly leveraged 
finance to growing industrial companies. The Japanese banks never had any significant 
capabilities to monitor these companies, as evidenced by the their rush to make 
speculative loans during the Bubble Economy of the late 1980s and their persistent bad-
debt burdens since the bubble burst in 1990. Japanese banks, that is, played a critical 
role in providing financial commitment, but no significant role in the exercise of 
strategic control.26 
What then ensured that the top executives of Japanese companies would exercise 
strategic control for the benefit of their companies rather than for their own personal 
gain? It was not the board of directors, which in Japan was almost entirely made up of 
inside executives, and indeed functioned more as a body for bestowing honorific 
positions on ageing top managers than as for corporate decision-making or oversight. 
As in the US Old Economy model at its innovative peak, the behavior of Japanese top 
managers was regulated by the cohesive organizations over which they presided, and in 
particular by the institution of permanent employment with the responsibility for 
maintaining the competitiveness of the company that it entailed. Over time, norms of 
corporate behavior evolved in Japan that no top executive could defy. Even though 
permanent employment is not a contractual relation at the level of the firm, under the 
‘doctrine of abusive dismissal’, courts have demanded that employers demonstrate, 
subject to strict criteria, ‘a business need’ for layoffs, and in the last half of the 1990s 
judges ruled that dismissals were unjustified in 80 percent of the cases brought before 
them (Ouchi 2002). By way of contrast, in the late 1980s, in the wake of a rash of 
corporate downsizings, the US labor movement had to wage a difficult, but ultimately 
successful, battle to get the US Congress to pass a law requiring a company to give 
workers in plants with 100 or more employees 60-day notice that the facility was going 
to be closed. 
Business models: variety and change 
The comparison of the British, US, and Japanese business models coming into the last 
decades of the twentieth century makes it clear that, among the rich nations, economic 
institutions have varied markedly. Indeed, once one explores the distinctive 
characteristics of the social conditions of innovative enterprise that define a business 
model, one finds a large number of distinctive ‘varieties of capitalism’, not just on a 
global scale but also in close proximity to one another in Western Europe. As I show 
below, among the large Western European economies, two business models could not 
be more different than those that characterize the German and French economies. To 
make our analytical lives even more complicated, the business models that characterize 
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a national economy are subject to change. Nowhere over the past half century has such 
change been more evident than in the United States, where by the end of the twentieth 
century a New Economy business model had replaced the Old Economy model, 
particularly in the high-technology sectors of the economy. 
In what follows, I briefly sketch out the main characteristics of the German and French 
business models in terms of strategic control, organizational integration and financial 
commitment. Then I will conclude this section of the paper by outlining the distinctive 
characteristics of the US New Economy business model that in the late 1990s captured 
the attention of its competitors based in other developed nations. In an age of 
globalization, many observers believed that Western Europe and Japan would have to 
transform themselves to conform to this new American challenge. In fact, as I shall 
argue, in the conclusion to this paper, convergence has been anything but complete. 
 a) The German model27 
As depicted in Figure 10, the German model that evolved in the decades after the 
Second World War was characterized by a high degree of hierarchical integration, but 
considerable functional segmentation. The top executives of high-tech German firms are 
generally scientists or engineers who acquired their positions through careers within the 
company. They develop and implement their enterprise strategies through managing 
boards (Vorstand) made up of inside executives, while these strategies must gain the  
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approval of supervisory boards (Aufsichsräte). Since the early 1950s, German 
companies have been governed by a system of codetermination (Mitbestimmung) that 
includes employee representation on the supervisory board as well as the right to elect 
work councils (Betriebsäte) to engage management at the enterprise and plant levels. In 
companies with more than 2000 employees, the seats on the supervisory board are 
shared equally between shareholder and worker representatives, with the chairman of 
the board being a shareholder representative who can exercise a tie-breaking vote. 
Employees exert more direct, and arguably greater, influence over a company’s 
investment activities through works councils, which participate in decisions related to 
issues of remuneration, work conditions, and labor allocation, and have the right to 
receive information concerning the firm’s investment strategy and financial condition. 
In German companies, both shop-floor and managerial employees, are well-educated 
and trained, with entry into the world of employment typically being via a three-year 
‘dual apprenticeship system’ through which workers receive a combination of formal 
education and on-the-job training in a particular specialization. This skill-formation 
system is controlled at the regional level through the collaboration of employer and 
employee associations as well as relevant government ministries. Larger employers 
contribute disproportionately to funding the apprenticeships, thus in effect subsidizing 
the training of employees for regional small and medium sized firms.  
A great strength of German industry in the post-World War decades was the regional 
accumulation of skilled labor that supported symbiotic production in enterprises of 
different sizes, so that the ability to produce high-quality goods resided in both large 
managerial corporations and the smaller Mittelstand within the regional economy. A 
prime example of such a region was Baden-Württemburg, home to companies such as 
Robert Bosch, the Mercedes division of Daimler-Benz, and Porsche, and with a 
Mittelstand sector that focuses on engineering and metalworking, especially for the 
automobile industry. The leading firms in the regions played an important role in 
structuring the innovative contributions of medium-sized suppliers, while collective 
support for regional innovation came from financial and technology institutions 
organized by regional and municipal governments, non-profit organizations, and 
business associations. 
As a result of its governance and employment institutions, German production workers 
have possessed high levels of skill. In developing and utilizing these skills over the 
course of their careers, even shop-floor employees often have had the opportunity of 
moving up the company hierarchy through their area of specialization into the 
managerial ranks. Thus one has found in German companies a high degree of 
hierarchical integration of employees within an area of specialization, a mode in 
integration that is conducive to the production of high quality, even if high cost, 
products. During the post-Second World War decades, this mode of organizational 
integration, which differed markedly from the US system of hierarchical segmentation 
between managers and workers, provided the foundation for Germany’s global 
leadership in high-quality manufacturing.  
By relying on career-long functional specialization as a mode of hierarchical 
integration, however, the German business model fostered functional segmentation that 
left its mechanical and electrical engineering companies vulnerable to competitive 
challenges from more organizationally integrated rivals. In the first half of the 1990s, 
however, the Japanese were able to build on their advances in process innovation in the   48
automobile and machine tool industries to move from the lower ends of the markets, in 
which they had already confronted US hegemony in mass production, into higher 
quality luxury car and precision machine tool markets where they matched the Germans 
in quality and beat them in cost (see Figure 10). The result was, in 1993-94, a crisis in 
these sectors in Germany, with dramatic reductions in employment and attempts, with 
some success, to learn from the Japanese. At the same time, however, Germany was 
burdened by the needs to integrate East Germany, whose industry possessed far less 
productivity into the unified nation. 
In both developing its productive capabilities and responding to these challenges, West 
German firms had secure control over their internal revenues, which formed the 
foundation of their financial commitment. The institutional foundations for that 
financial commitment went back to the late nineteenth century when the ‘Great Banks’ 
had functioned as venture capitalists to German industry. The banks lent money to 
promising industrial firms and then, if and when these firms were well-established, 
floated ‘bearer’ shares in the firms among wealthy bank customers in order to enable the 
firms to pay back the bank loans. These bank customers in turn deposited the shares 
with the banks that then became the ‘bearers’ of these shares with the right to exercise 
the votes attached to them. In this way, the banks continued both to fund the growth of 
German firms and to protect them from outsiders who might try to lay claim to 
corporate revenues. The banks have exercised this protective role and kept themselves 
informed on the investment strategies of the companies concerned by having members 
on their supervisory boards. Nevertheless, compared with the high debt-equity ratios 
that characterized Japanese industrial enterprises in their era of high-speed growth, 
German firms have been able and willing to grow with much more conservative debt 
burdens, making them much less dependent on bank borrowing than their Japanese 
competitors. 
b) The French model28 
The case of France provides yet another distinctive ‘variety of capitalism’ characterized 
by unique social conditions of innovative enterprise (see Figure 11). Of all of the major 
developed economies, the economic development of France was, in the last half of the 
twentieth century, the most explicitly state-led. In the decades after the Second World 
War France constructed a national innovation system based on national research 
laboratories (CNRS – Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique) and the state 
championing of a number of industrial corporations capable of transforming that 
research into military and commercial products. In particular, state-led efforts focused 
on the aeronautics, electronics, nuclear, space, and telecommunications sectors, with 
military expenditure playing an extremely important role. 
Linking the state sector and the industrial firms has been a power elite, deliberately and 
openly created by the state, whose origins can be traced back to the Napoleonic era. At 
an early age through a national competition, the future leaders of French government 
and business gain admission to one of the ‘grandes écoles’, most notably Ecole 
Polytechnique for engineers and Ecole National d’Administration (ENA) for managers. 
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Figure 11. The French business model 
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Within their broad areas of specialization, these elite students subsequently enter the 
labor force as members of a ‘grand corps’ through which they maintain links with one 
another over the course of their careers. Engineers may enter industry directly but many 
Polytechniciens and Enarques spend the first portion of their careers in the civil service 
before entering, through a process known as ‘pantouflage’, business enterprises as high-
level executives. In 1990 45 percent of the PDGs (Président-directeur générals) of 200 
largest French corporations had come through this system. 
The existence of this power elite was critical in aligning business-government relations 
in the massive restructuring of high-tech industry that was undertaken by the French 
state in the 1980s and early 1990s. The Mitterand nationalization program in 1982-83 
led to massive amounts of public funds being invested in the modernization of a number 
of capital-intensive, high-technology companies, including, among others, Compagnie 
Générale d’Electricité in electrical equipment, Rhône-Poulenc in chemicals, Saint-
Gobain-Pont à Mousson in glass, paper, and metals, and the combination of Sacilor and 
Usinor in steel. With the government typically assuming 100 percent ownership and 
with members of the grand corps in key executive positions, the state exercised 
strategic control and provided financial commitment to restructure these nationalized 
companies to compete globally.  
Subsequently, beginning in 1986, a number of the nationalized companies were 
privatized. To ensure that strategic decision-making in the privatized firms would 
remain under the control of the French elite, French companies agreed to enter into a 
system of cross-shareholding that created a noyau dur (hard core) of stable 
shareholders. Although in the late 1990s, as discussed below, there was considerable 
unraveling of this cross-shareholding, the system of recruiting top executives of major 
French companies remains intact. That system also means, however, that, as depicted in 
Figure 11, there is a segmentation in terms of organizational learning between these top 
executives and the rest of the business organization. As Patrick Fridenson has put it:   50
‘Most French top managers have no direct experience of shared work with either other 
managers or workers’ (1997: 219-20). Given their elite positions, however, these top 
executives tend to be mission-oriented, giving employees a clear understanding of the 
objectives of the enterprise and an assurance that the resources will be mobilized to 
carry out those goals. It is probably for this reason that French companies have been 
particularly innovative in carrying out big projects in areas such as transportation and 
communication. 
Given the way in which top managers of French industrial enterprises have been 
recruited, the middle managers, or cadres, who design a company’s products and 
oversee its operations, have little if any possibility of rising to the top of the companies 
in which they pursue their careers. In the high-tech sector, these middle managers tend 
to have engineering degrees with a theoretical orientation toward solving problems 
within well-defined systems. Below the cadres in the enterprise hierarchy are 
techniciens, whose education (a two-year technician diploma) and experience enable 
them to solve practical industrial problems, and who have traditionally had little 
opportunity for upward mobility to the cadre ranks (although channels for movement up 
the hierarchy opened somewhat in the 1990s). 
Segmented from the techniciens are semi-skilled and unskilled production workers, or 
ouvriers.  France entered the post-Second World War decades with a domestic 
population that was still rural and with a large colonial presence. As French industry 
expanded in the postwar decades, it drew upon this unskilled labor force for shop-floor 
work. These workers had a low level of unionization, but were often very militant. One 
mode of stemming this militancy was the granting of wage concessions. In his study of 
the evolution of the car manufacturer, Renault, during the post-Second World War 
decades to the mid-1990s, Michel Freyssenet (1998: 374) shows how, in response to 
shop-floor conflict, between about 1980 and 1990, ‘unskilled’ workers disappeared 
from Renault plants as they were reclassified as ‘skilled’ workers, even without any 
change in the content of their work, so that they could qualify for higher wages. In the 
corporate restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s, early retirement schemes, funded by the 
government eased a large proportion of these workers out of the labor force. More 
recently, the numbers of shop-floor workers has been further reduced in the major 
corporations through outsourcing. At the same time, these companies have been 
upgrading the skills of younger workers, supported by a concerted state effort to 
increase the proportion of the school-age population who receive the baccalauréat, the 
certificate that permits high-school graduates to continue in higher education. 
As for financial commitment, France has perhaps the most explicitly state-backed 
system of bank finance of industrial enterprises. As already mentioned, in the 1980s the 
state took critical enterprises that needed restructuring under its direct ownership and 
control, and then financed that restructuring as a prelude to reprivatizing these 
companies on a more globally competitive basis. The fact that the unraveling of the 
cross-shareholdings of these privatized corporations in the last half of the 1990s resulted 
in foreign institutional investors buying up significant amounts of shares of French 
companies had led some observers to argue that French companies have become 
dependent on foreign capital, with a consequent loss of strategic control (see Goyer 
2001; Hancké 2001: 330). But, as recent research by O’Sullivan (2005) has shown, the 
influx of foreign investors was in response to an ebullient stock market, in part fostered 
by the willingness of the French corporate elite to permit a more widespread distribution 
of their companies’ shares. French corporations took advantage of the rising stock   51
market to use their stock as a currency to acquire foreign companies as part of strategy 
of global expansion. In some cases, the stock was used directly as the acquisition 
currency; for example, in the United States where many of the acquisitions were done 
using American Depository Receipts (ADRs) that permitted the acquired companies to 
be paid in a stock-based currency denominated in US dollars, while in other cases, the 
rising stock market facilitated the floating convertible bonds for acquisition purposes. 
As O’Sullivan points out, the unraveling of cross-shareholdings left French companies 
more vulnerable to outside challenges to strategic control. These corporate strategies 
were not, however, dictated by a dependence on global capital markets for finance. 
Rather French companies pursued these strategies to become increase their presence in 
the global economy and sought to make use of capital markets, both in France and 
abroad, toward that end. 
c) The US New Economy model29 
During the 1970s and 1980s while Japanese enterprises were challenging established 
US managerial corporations in many industries in which they had been dominant, there 
was a resurgence of the US information and communications technology (ICT) 
industries, providing the foundation for what by the last half of the 1990s became 
known as the ‘New Economy’. Historically, underlying the emergence of the New 
Economy were massive post-Second World War investments by the US government, in 
collaboration with research universities and industrial corporations, in developing 
computer and communications technologies.  
By the end of the 1950s, this combined business-government investment effort had 
resulted in not only the first generation of computers, with IBM as the leading firm, but 
also the capability of imbedding integrated electronic circuits on a silicon chip, with 
Fairchild Semiconductor and Texas Instruments in the forefront of creating the 
technology that would become the standard of the semiconductor industry. Through the 
early 1960s the US government provided virtually all of the demand for 
semiconductors. From the second half of the 1960s, however, a growing array of 
commercial opportunities for electronic chips induced the creation of semiconductor 
startups. A new breed of venture capitalist, many with prior managerial or technical 
experience in the semiconductor industry, backed so many semiconductor startups 
clustered in the region around Stanford University that by the early 1970s the district 
was dubbed ‘Silicon Valley’. Innovation in semiconductors, and especially the 
development of the microprocessor – in effect a computer on a chip – created the basis 
for the emergence of the microcomputer industry from the late 1970s, which in turn 
resulted in the enormous growth of an installed base of powerful ‘hosts’ in homes and 
offices that made possible the Internet revolution of the 1990s. 
Intense, and often informal, learning networks that transcended the boundaries of firms 
contributed to the success of Silicon Valley. Like the British industrial districts that 
Alfred Marshall had described a century earlier, there is no doubt that, in Silicon Valley, 
‘the mysteries of the trade…were in the air’. But in its strategy, organization, and 
finance, the New Economy business model (see Figure 12) that emerged in Silicon 
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Valley differed significantly from the Marshallian industrial district. Those who have 
exercised strategic control have been professional managers, typically with engineering 
backgrounds. Organizational learning occurred across firms, as AnnaLee Saxenian 
(1994) has stressed, but it also, and I would argue more fundamentally, occurred within 
firms that integrated skill bases of highly educated personnel, enabling some 
particularly innovative enterprises such as Hewlett-Packard, Intel, Sun Microsystems, 
Oracle, and Cisco Systems that grew to employ tens of thousands of employees to drive 
the development of the region. In the early stages a firm’s growth, venture capital 
provided the committed finance for these learning enterprises, and through its success in 
Silicon Valley from the 1960s venture capital evolved into an industry in its own right. 
The founders of New Economy firms have typically been engineers who have gained 
specialized experience in existing firms, although in some cases they have been 
university faculty members intent on commercializing their academic knowledge. While 
some of these entrepreneurs have come from existing Old Economy companies, where 
it was often difficult for their new ideas to get internal backing, New Economy 
companies themselves became increasingly important as sources of new entrepreneurs 
who left their current employers to start new firms. Typically the founding 
entrepreneurs of a New Economy startup sought committed finance from venture 
capitalists with whom they shared not only ownership of the company but also strategic 
control. Besides sitting on the board of directors of the new company, the venture 
capitalists would generally recruit professional managers, who would be given company 
stock along with stock options, to lead the transformation of the firm from a new 
venture to a going concern. This stock-based compensation gave these managers a 
powerful financial incentive to develop the innovative capabilities of the company to the 
point where it could do an IPO or private sale to an established company. But, both 
before and after making this transition, their tenure with, and value to, the company 
depended on their managerial capabilities, not their fractional ownership stakes.   53
Key to making this transition from new venture to going concern is the organizational 
integration of an expanding body of technical and managerial ‘talent’. What came to be 
known as ‘broad-based’ employee stock option plans became an important mode of 
compensation, usually as a partial substitute for cash salaries, for a startup to attract 
these highly mobile people and retain their services. The underlying stock would 
become valuable if and when the startup did an IPO or private sale to a publicly listed 
company, thus enabling the startup’s privately held shares to be transformed into 
publicly traded shares. Shortening the expected period between the launch of a company 
and an IPO was the practice of most venture-backed high-tech startups of going public 
on the NASDAQ exchange (founded in 1971), with its much less stringent listing 
requirements than the Old Economy NYSE. If and when the firm did an IPO or was 
acquired by another publicly listed company, the venture capitalists could sell their 
shareholdings on the stock market, thereby exiting from their investments in the firm, 
while entrepreneurs could also transform some or all of their ownership stakes into cash. 
With the company’s stock being publicly traded, employees who exercised their stock 
options could easily turn their shares into cash.  
During the 1980s and 1990s the liberal use of stock as a compensation currency, not 
only for top executives as had been the case in Old Economy companies since the 
1950s, but also for a broad base of non-executive personnel became a distinctive feature 
of New Economy firms. For example, Cisco Systems, which grew from about 200 
employees at the time of its IPO in 1990 to 38,000 employees in 2001, awarded stock 
options to all of its employees, so that by 2001 stock options outstanding accounted for 
over 14 percent of the company’s total stock outstanding. Since Cisco did hardly any of 
its own manufacturing – another distinctive characteristic of many New Economy 
‘systems integrators’ – the people in the skill base to whom these options were awarded 
were almost all highly educated employees who were potentially highly mobile on the 
labor market.  
Besides using their own stock as a compensation currency, during the 1990s some New 
Economy companies grew large by using their stock, instead of cash, to acquire other, 
smaller and typically younger, New Economy firms in order to gain access to new 
technologies and markets. Cisco mastered this growth-through-acquisition strategy. 
From 1993 through 2004 Cisco made 94 acquisitions valued in nominal terms at almost 
$39 billion, over 96 percent of which was paid in the company’s stock rather than cash. 
In 1999 and 2000 alone, Cisco did 44 percent of its acquisitions at a cost of 69 percent 
of the total value (in nominal dollars) expended in the 1993-2004 period, with over 99 
percent paid in stock.  
At the same time Cisco conserved cash by paying no dividends, a mode of financial 
commitment that also distinguished New Economy from Old Economy companies. As a 
result, Cisco’s astonishing growth in the 1990s occurred without the company taking on 
any long-term debt. Nevertheless, with the bursting of the New Economy bubble from 
mid-2000, Cisco spent billions of dollars repurchasing its own stock to support its 
sagging stock price. Even during the boom, when stock prices were rising, the extent to 
which New Economy companies issued stock to make acquisitions and compensate 
employees meant that some of them spent billions of dollars on stock repurchases. For 
example, from 1997 through 2000 Intel repurchased $18.8 billion in its own stock while 
paying out $1.2 billion in dividends, and Microsoft repurchased $13.4 billion while 
paying out $800,000 in dividends. By way of comparison, R&D spending over these 
same four years was $14.2 billion at Intel and $11.2 billion at Microsoft.   54
As in the cases of Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco, by the end of the twentieth century a 
number of New Economy companies had grown to be formidable growing concerns. In 
2003 the top 500 US-based companies by sales included 20 ICT firms founded no 
earlier than 1959 that had been neither spun off from nor merged with an Old Economy 
firm. These 20 companies had revenues ranging from $41.4 billion for Dell Computer to 
$3.4 billion for Gateway, with an average of $11.9 billion. Their headcounts ranged 
from 79,700 for Intel to 7,400 for Gateway, with an average of 35,100. Nine of these 20 
companies were based in Silicon Valley, another two in Southern California, and the 
other nine in eight states around the United States.  
Innovative New Economy companies have tended to grow large by upgrading and 
expanding their product offerings within their main lines of business, and thus far at 
least have not engaged in the indiscriminate diversification into unrelated technologies 
and markets that characterized, and ultimately undermined the performance of, many 
leading Old Economy companies in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, New 
Economy companies have become less vertically integrated than Old Economy 
companies because equipment manufacturers such as Cisco, Dell, and Sun 
Microsystems have focused their investment strategies on activities that require 
organizational learning in their core competencies, while outsourcing activities that, as 
is the case with semiconductor fabrication, are too expensive and complex to be done 
in-house, or, alternatively, as is the case with printed circuit board assembly, have 
become routine. Some of the largest ICT companies in the United States are upstream 
electronics components suppliers, most of which, in terms of the social conditions of 
innovative enterprise, can be classified as New Economy firms. The world’s five largest 
contract manufacturers – Flextronics, Solectron, Sanmina-SCI, Celestica, and Jabil 
Circuit – to whom equipment manufacturers outsource the mass production of printed 
circuit boards and other components, employed a total of 266,000 people at the end of 
2003.  
A main competitive advantage of the leading contract manufacturers is their ability to 
relocate production processes that have become cost-sensitive and routine to lower 
wage global locations. Indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s, well before the rise of the 
contract manufacturers as an outsourcing option for OEMs, growing Silicon Valley 
companies took the lead in offshoring more routine production processes, especially to 
Asia. While strategy and learning remained centered in the United States, the New 
Economy business model was able to tap into a global labor supply. During the 1980s 
and 1990s growing numbers of foreigners, especially from Asia, obtained graduate 
degrees in science and technology from US universities, and then entered the US labor 
force, often obtaining immigrant status as permanent residents. Additionally, during the 
1990s large numbers of foreigners gained production experience in US high-technology 
industries under non-immigrant visa programs. The H-1B program enables a non-
immigrant whose skills are purportedly unavailable in the United States and has at least 
a bachelor’s degree (the most notable exception being fashion models) to work in the 
United States for up to six years. Seventy percent of H-1B visa holders have science or 
technology degrees, and two-fifths to one half come from India (the next largest 
national group is from China, at less than ten percent). The L1 visa program permits a 
company with operations in the United States to transfer foreign employees to the 
United States to acquire work experience, with no limitation of time. In 2001, there 
were an estimated 810,000 people on H-1B visas in the United States, and possibly as 
hundreds of thousands of highly educated people on L1 visas. Many have continued to 
work in the United States by obtaining permanent resident status, but most have   55
returned to their native countries with valuable industrial experience, that can be used to 
start new firms and, more typically, to work as technical specialists for indigenous or 
foreign companies.  
This reverse migration that converts a ‘brain drain’ into a ‘capability gain’ is similar to 
the return of high-tech personnel to South Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s to 
help develop their industrial economies. The availability of this highly educated and 
experienced global labor supply is a prime reason for a step increase in the 2000s in 
offshoring by US companies to Asia, especially to India and China, and the fact that this 
offshored activities increasingly require not only routine work but also organizational 
learning that was previously only carried out in the United States.  
5  Implications for understanding corporate governance and economic 
development 
In 1967 the French journalist, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s best-selling Le Défi 
Américain [The American Challenge] warned European nations of the need to unify to 
avert the dominance of their economies by US corporate power. In the same year, on the 
other side of the Atlantic, the US economist John Kenneth Galbraith, published his best-
selling The New Industrial State, in which he assumed that the prevailing US business 
model had achieved a degree of dominance that was impervious to external threat. Both 
Servan-Schreiber and Galbraith were acute observers of contemporary reality, whose 
books on US corporate power in the immediate post-Second World War decades 
deserved the wide readership that they achieved. Both books raised important questions 
about the relation between corporate governance institutions and economic development 
in the developed economies. Neither book, however, provided an accurate guide to the 
future of corporate governance and performance. Their authors did not foresee how the 
US business model that prevailed in the 1960s would itself be challenged in the decades 
to come, in part because of its own internal weaknesses and in part because of more 
powerful business models emanating from abroad. Neither author, for example, 
envisioned the impending rise of the Japanese as powerful corporate competitors, but in 
this oversight in the late 1960s they were hardly alone. 
In historical retrospect, as outlined in this paper, we can now see that in the post-Second 
World War decades there were a number of contending business models in the process 
of evolution in the developed national economies. During this postwar reconstruction 
period, corporations based in these different nations had, to a greater or lesser extent, 
privileged access to their growing domestic markets. Increasingly in the 1970s and 
1980s, however, these different business models competed head-to-head on global 
markets, and by no means with equivalent capabilities. The distinctive social conditions 
of innovative enterprise that characterized these different business models go some way 
in explaining national competitive performance in globalized industries such as 
automobiles, electronics, and machine tools circa 1980. In this competition, on the basis 
of the organizational capabilities that I have depicted in Figures 8 through 11, Japan 
emerged as the high-quality, low-cost producer; Germany as the high-quality, high-cost 
producer; the United States as the low-quality, low-cost producer, and Britain as the 
low-quality, high-cost producer, with France somewhere in the middle of this group in 
terms of quality and cost (see Lazonick and O’Sullivan 1996; 1997).   56
If one wants to understand the evolution of ‘varieties of capitalism’ that are in 
competition with one another, one needs a framework for analyzing the social 
conditions of innovative enterprise.30 At a minimum, the application of such a 
framework, as has been done in the paper, should make one cautious of the use of 
dichotomous classifications such a ‘liberal market economies’ and ‘coordinated market 
economies’ (see Hall and Soskice 2001) that lump together nations such as the United 
States and Britain on one side, and Germany and Japan on the other. By the same token, 
I would argue that if one wants to understand the fundamental institutional differences 
that distinguish these developed economies from one another, one must analyze them 
first and foremost as corporate economies rather than as market economies (see 
Lazonick 2003b). 
If only because of global competition, the business models that I have described in this 
paper have all undergone change, and we can expect that they will continue to do so. 
The deficiencies of the British business model, for example, meant that it did not in any 
significant way survive to the end of the 20
th century, although that nation still copes 
with the governance, employment, and investment institutions that are a legacy of the 
past prevalence of a hierarchically and functionally segmented business model. As I 
have also argued, the dominant US business model has undergone dramatic change; in 
2005 one can argue that the evolution of the New Economy business model has had 
such a profound impact on US governance, employment, and investment institutions 
that the Old Economy business model, insofar as it exists, is an anachronism; a 
statement that for lack of understanding of the evolving New Economy business model 
and a (related) inability to foresee the future, I would not have made a decade ago 
notwithstanding the fact that I understood that the innovative capacity of the 
‘Chandlerian’ managerial enterprise was in decline (compare Lazonick 1994 and 2006). 
During the Internet boom of the late 1990s, when the notion of the ‘New Economy’ 
came into vogue, the US business model, including the ideology of maximizing 
shareholder value, became attractive to policy-makers in the ‘social market economies’ 
of Europe as well as in Japan (Lazonick 1999; Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000b). 
Previously Europeans had associated the US Old Economy model with decline, 
manifested by relentless downsizing and growing income inequality. In contrast, they 
saw the New Economy model as a generator of innovation and development. There 
began to be talk about convergence of business models of the developed economies 
toward the US ‘ideal’, by which what was generally meant was a business model 
governed by the principle of maximizing shareholder value. 
Although infatuation with this mantra was short-lived in Japan (see Lazonick 1999; 
Dore 2000), it had staying power in Europe, even convincing some proponents of 
European social market institutions that US and British pension and mutual funds would 
starve European companies of investment capital if they failed to take immediate steps 
to boost their stock prices. As in the United States, many European executives imbibed 
the shareholder view of the world because they envied their US counterparts for their 
freedom of action in corporate restructuring and their rich rewards from stock-based 
compensation. Ultimately European companies adapted certain elements of the New 
Economy business model such as (on a more constrained level than in the United States) 
                                                 
30  For two excellent collections of papers on the burgeoning ‘varieties of capitalism’ debates, see Coates 
2002 and Whitley 2002.   57
stock-based compensation, the use of stock to acquire other companies (particularly in 
the French case), and outsourcing of routine activities (see Carpenter et al. 2003; 
Glimstedt and Lazonick 2005). In terms of the basic social conditions of innovative 
enterprise, however, the German, French, and Japanese business models have remained 
intact (see O’Sullivan 2003b and 2005; Lazonick 2005).  
What then are the implications for developing nations of the perspective that I have 
presented on corporate governance, innovation, and economic development, based as 
that perspective is on the comparative-historical experiences of the developed nations. 
While there exist important problems in structuring corporate governance institutions to 
promote further economic development in the developed economies, the real test of this 
approach depends on what guidance it can provide to developing economies. In my 
view, however, it makes no sense to advise developing economies on the path to 
development unless one can be sure that that advice is based on the reality, not the 
ideology, of how the rich got rich. 
If one agrees that innovation is fundamental to economic development, then the 
perspective that I have presented provides a response to the neoclassical contention that 
state intervention and subsidies to industry can only undermine the economic progress 
of the developing nations, not advance it. We know from the work of Ha-Joon Chang 
(2002) that neoclassical ideology has been instrumental in ‘kicking away the ladder’ of 
industrial policy that the developed nations have themselves climbed to become rich to 
deny developing nations from scaling the same heights. The theory of innovative 
enterprise that I have presented in this paper provides the microfoundations for 
countering the neoclassical argument. In effect, the dynamics of the innovating firm that 
are depicted in Figures 1 and 2 explain why in the face of established international 
competition, tariff protection, or some other type of subsidy, may be necessary to 
transform the high fixed costs of a innovative strategy into low unit costs (see also 
Lazonick 1993). It also explains why the success or failure of tariff protection will 
depend on the social conditions of innovative enterprise. 
Applied to a developing nation, the theory of the innovating firm depicted in Figures 1 
and 2 is none other than the infant-industry argument. Within this framework, tariff 
protection provides the firms that constitute a national industry with a form of financial 
commitment while they are engaging in what can be called ‘indigenous innovation’ (see 
Lazonick 2004b), and have yet to transform the high fixed costs of that innovation 
strategy into low unit costs. But financial commitment in and of itself does not, and 
cannot, ensure the success of an innovative investment strategy. Given the financial 
commitment provided by tariff protection, it matters who exercises strategic control and 
what types of investments in organizational learning they make. Arguments for the 
efficacy of tariff protection, and other forms of subsidy, for developing economies need 
to specify the business model that will combine strategic control, organizational 
integration and financial commitment to generate innovation as a foundation for 
economic development. 
The variety of innovative business models in the developed economies, both at a point 
in time and over time, suggests that there is no single model of innovative enterprise 
that will necessarily achieve success in any particular national context. Rather, as 
emphasized previously, the theory of innovative enterprise provides a framework for 
empirical research that can firstly identify the conditions of innovative enterprise 
germane to any particular social context, and then analyze how these conditions in fact   58
support the innovation process in particular firms in particular industries in particular 
eras. Such an approach is precisely the one that was taken by the late Qiwen Lu in his 
pioneering book, China’s Leap into the Information Age (2000). Lu identified the role 
of the Chinese state in providing the knowledge infrastructure for innovative enterprise, 
and the role of strategic control, organizational integration, and financial commitment in 
the evolution of four major indigenous Chinese computer electronics companies. Lu’s 
work fits with the approaches by Martin Bell and Keith Pavitt (1993), Linsu Kim 
(1997), John Mathews and Dong-Sung Cho (2000), Mike Hobday (2001), and Dieter 
Ernst (2002) among others who have addressed the question of indigenous innovation. 
This type of research shows that policy debates ignore at their peril the role of 
innovative enterprise in economic development. If there is one enduring lesson that the 
developing nations can learn from the developed nations, that would be it. 
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